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Abstract




Previous research on the impact of reforms to the Portuguese electoral system has assessed
mechanical effects assuming that the behavior of individuals would remain the same. We
improve on this state of affairs by using a rich dataset to study the impact of district
magnitude on three relevant decisions made by individuals: the decision to vote or abstain,
the decision to vote sincerely or not and the party choice decision. Then, we use our models
to predict the effects of four alternative scenarios: uniform-size circles, a reduction of
Members of Parliament to 180, a national circle and single-member circles. Besides making
contributions to the understanding of how several individual and contextual-level variables
shape the voting behavior of the Portuguese, we make four additional contributions in
this study. Firstly, we show that the relationship between district magnitude and the
probability of abstention is negative and shows diminishing returns. Secondly, we show
that the impact of district magnitude on the probability of voting strategically is strikingly
similar to its impact on the probability of abstaining. Thirdly, we show that district
magnitude plays an important role in shaping the choice of party by individuals. Finally,
by using the models estimated we quantify the impact of different types of redistricting
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1 Introduction
Even though in 40 years of democracy there has not been any significant change in the
Portuguese electoral system (with the exception of the reduction of the number of the
Members of Parliament from 250 to 230), the electoral reform has been a recurring theme
in the Portuguese political agenda and several alternatives have been debated, including
a further decrease in the number of Members of Parliament (henceforth MPs) and a
transition to a new system that would comprise single-member circles or small multi-
member circles with a national circle.
The knowledge of the effects of these alternative scenarios is essential so that they can be
assessed strictly. However, research on this topic has focused on the mechanical effects of
reforms such as the conversion of votes into seats, assuming that the electoral behavior of
electors would remain unchanged if electoral rules changed (e.g. Presidência do Conselho
de Ministros (1997) and Freire et al. (2008)). This study is innovative in that it studies
what would possibly be the adjustment of the electors’ strategies to the change in electoral
rules and not the mechanical effects already addressed by these contributions.
Our approach is to first model three relevant decisions made by individuals: the decision
to vote or abstain, the decision to vote sincerely or strategically and the party choice
decision. With this analysis, we identify the impact of the number of seats assigned to
each district (defined by Rae (1971) as district magnitude) on these decisions. Then, we
use our results to predict the effects of four alternative scenarios: a scenario where all
circles have the same magnitude, a reduction to 180 MPs, a national circle and single-
member circles.
Our approach is innovative and the gains from using it are twofold.
First, our analysis does not draw on a cross-national sample, but uses elections taking
place in the same country to avoid possible heterogeneity problems from cross-national
pooling. Indeed, the design of any electoral reform, albeit supported by comparative stud-
ies, should essentially focus on the analysis of the respective countries because the effects
of changes in electoral systems depend on the characteristics of the country concerned,
such as basic and social cleavages, cultural factors and the national political context (see
Hix et al. (2013)). Moreover, cross national studies typically summarize the distribution
of district magnitude within the country using only one single value such as the mean
which can be very problematic when district magnitude varies a lot within the country
(see Monroe and Rose (2002)).
Portugal fits the ideal conditions for this single country analysis since it has a large vari-
ation of district magnitude (currently from 2 seats in the electoral circle of Portalegre to
1
47 seats in Lisbon). Indeed, Monroe and Rose (2002) examined a sample of sixteen coun-
tries using districted proportional representation systems and concluded that Portugal
is the country with the largest degree of variation in district magnitude. This variation
combined with a high nationalization of the party system creates the ideal conditions for
this analysis.
Second, our study uses individual-level data, which is the most appropriate type of data
when we are interested in studying the behavior of individuals, avoiding ecological fallacies
associated to the use of aggregate data (see Robinson (2009)).
Overall, we contribute to the study of an object of high complexity - the reform of an
electoral system - and we believe our conclusions will enrich the quality of this debate
that has recently gained a fresh prominence with the issuance of a manifesto by a list
of thirty “independent figures” with political ties (see Bourbon (2014)). Moreover, the
analysis of our controls examines different factors that influence the electoral behavior of
the Portuguese, reasserting previous knowledge but also contradicting some conclusions
from other studies and illuminating important new aspects.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. The second section presents a brief overview
of the Portuguese electoral system and of the 2002 and 2005 elections. The third section
describes the proposals that have been made for an electoral reform. The fourth section
describes the dataset. The fifth section explores the decision to vote or abstain, the sixth
section explores the decision to vote sincerely or not and section 7 explores the party
choice decision. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Brief Overview of the Portuguese Electoral System
and of the 2002 and 2005 Elections
Given that our study uses Portuguese data for the 2002 and 2005 elections, it is informative
at this point to summarize some of the relevant characteristics of the Portuguese electoral
system and of these elections that are important to the understanding of our study’s
methodology and results.
Since the original drafting of the 1976 Constitution, Portugal has used a proportional
representation system. Electors vote in the electoral circle where they are registered.
Candidates must be presented in party lists and electors vote in one and only one of
the lists presented by the political parties, with no possibility for preferential votes to
be expressed (closed lists). Votes are then converted into seats in each electoral circle
using the D’Hondt formula and there are no electoral thresholds. Candidates are elected
according to the votes received by their party and according to the order in which their
name appears in the party list.
There are two two-member districts for Portuguese citizens living abroad and the remain-
ing 226 legislators are elected in twenty electoral circles with a magnitude that currently
ranges from 2 in the district of Portalegre to 47 in Lisbon (see Figure 2.1). In 2002,
district magnitude ranged from 3 in Portalegre to 48 in Lisbon; in 2005, it ranged from 2
in Portalegre to 48 in Lisbon.
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Figure 2.1: District Magnitude in Portugal
Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 71-11/04/2011
The two major parties are the center-left Socialist Party (PS) and the center-right Social
Democratic Party (PPD-PSD). There are also three minor parties that hold seats: a
communist-green alliance (CDU), a conservative party (CDS-PP) and a relatively new
left party, the “Left Block” (BE).
Given that our dataset covers the elections of 2002 and 2005, we also present a brief
summary of these elections.
The 2002 election took place after the resignation of the former Socialist Prime-Minister
António Guterres, following a defeat of PS in the local elections. A right-wing coalition
between PSD and CDS-PP came to power with the PSD leader Durão Barroso as Prime
Minister.
The 2005 election was won by PS, which obtained its first absolute majority in Par-
liament, and took place after the decision of President Jorge Sampaio of dissolving the
Parliament due to to the political instability caused by the government led by Pedro
Santana Lopes (PSD) in coalition with the CDS-PP. Pedro Santana Lopes had become
Prime-Minister after Durão Barroso left the country in order to become President of the
European Commission.
The national level results of these two elections are presented in Table 2.1.
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Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 77-2/04/2002 and Number 47-8/03/2005
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3 Proposals for an Electoral Reform
As in other countries, the electoral reform has been a recurring theme in the Portuguese
political agenda.
The first wave of proposals occurred in the second half of the 1980s and regarded a
change to a system of majority representation that would privilege governability at the
expense of proportionality. These proposals emerged as Portugal had five legislative
elections between December 1979 and July 1987, which is around an election every 18
months. However, these proposals were no longer discussed after the emergence of absolute
majorities of one party between 1987 and 1995 and between 2005 and 2009.
More recently, the discussion shifted to two main points (see Freire et al. (2008)).
First, the divergence of positions concerning the optimal number of MPs has been a
controversial aspect. The original text of the Portuguese Constitution has set up a number
of MPs that could vary between 240 and 250, and the ceiling was chosen due to concerns
about proportionality. In 1989, concerns with the governability of the system created by
political instability led to a constitutional revision that reduced the number of MPs to a
minimum of 230 and a maximum of 235. This time the minimum was chosen. In 1997, the
constitutional revision reduced the number of MPs to a minimum of 180 and a maximum
of 230, and the ceiling was chosen. This sequence of events led to the ever-recurring
question of whether Portugal has an excessive number of MPs or not.
In 2007, PSD proposed a decrease in the number of MPs to 181 for reasons related to
the dignity and efficacy of parliamentary work (Guedes et al. (2007)). However, this
proposal was rejected by BE, CDS-PP, PCP and PS. These parties have argued that,
from a comparative perspective with other EU countries, Portugal does not have a high
number of MPs and a reduction could have negative consequences on the proportionality
of the system since it would decrease average district magnitude (see Freire et al. (2008)).
Recently, the PS leader said that he will propose reducing the number of MPs to 180 by
September 15 (JN (2014)).
Second, the debate has focused on the transition to a system that favors a greater prox-
imity between the elected and the electorate, ensuring a greater accountability of MPs
and increasing the levels of electoral participation. Two main proposals have been made
in this area.
One solution, advocated by PS and PSD, is a transition to a new system that would
comprise single-member circles with a national circle (Rodrigues et al. (2002) and Guedes
et al. (2007)). Single-member circles would permit a better knowledge of the elected by
the electorate and the implied distortions in proportionality would be compensated by a
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national circle.
This proposal has been subject to criticism, in particular due to the disadvantages as-
sociated to single-member constituencies (see VV.AA. (1998a)). First, single-member
districts can lead to a logic of localism and clientelism in the political competition: the
political discussion would give much more prominence to local problems and MPs would
give more emphasis to the satisfaction of the interests of the constituents of the circle by
which they were elected than to the interests of the country. Second, there is the risk
that this system would lead to a bipolarization since in these circles only a party can
win and therefore the chances of victory would, in general, be focused on the two major
parties (e.g. VV.AA. (1998b) and VV.AA. (1998c)). As pointed out by Teixeira (2009)
one could expect the introduction of single-member circles “to increase further the effects
of the so-called strategic voting” since the electors would be “forced” to vote in one of the
two major parties.
Given these shortcomings of single-member circles, Freire et al. (2008) have proposed
a system that combines a national circle with multi-member circles of low or medium
magnitude (3-10 seats). This proposal was object of a considerable debate since it was
known and, in December 2008, PS organized a Parliamentary Conference in the National
Assembly with the participation of the authors and various experts that has not led to
any reform.
Thus, in 40 years of democracy, there has not been any considerable change in the Por-
tuguese electoral system with the exception of the reduction of the number of MPs from
250 to 230. Inter-party divisions have contributed to the failure of reforms but there is
also a “fear of the unknown” (Katz (2005)) since any reform is associated with a high
level of uncertainty regarding its effects. The knowledge of the effects of these alternative
scenarios is essential so that they can be assessed strictly and this fear is reduced. This
study intends to contribute to the enrichment of this debate by studying what would
possibly be the adjustment of the electors’ strategies to the change in electoral rules.




We have built a database that consists of a merger of three different datasets.
Firstly, as individual level data we use survey data from the election study for 2002 and
2005 coordinated by ICS-UL (Social Sciences Institute of the University of Lisbon). The
data is based on a random probability sample of eligible voters and includes electoral
behavior of 2801 individuals in these years as well as several other variables such as
sociodemographic measures. Secondly, the data on district magnitude was obtained in
the Official Gazette. Finally, data on the rain was obtained in the Portuguese Weather
Institute (IPMA).
Our dataset does not cover four electoral districts: Madeira and Azores (which are not
in mainland Portugal), Europe (the district for the Portuguese citizens living abroad in
Europe) and Outside Europe (the district for the Portuguese citizens living abroad but
not in Europe) because individual-level data is not available.
Almost all variables in the raw data have missing values. On average, the missing per-
centage is equal to 6.8%, which is a relatively small number, for example comparing with
the percentages reported by Lee and Kang (2009), which lie between 10% and 20%. We
have removed all observations with any missing value. Respondents who do not know the
answers or refused to answer are coded as missing.
In each part of this study, we will present appropriate descriptive statistics according
to the particular decision that we will be analyzing. We present, however, descriptive
statistics for three demographic variables that are used throughout our analysis (gender,
age and region) and compare them with the Census 2001 information (Figures 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3). We also break down our dataset by district magnitude (Table 4.1).
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Source of Census 2001 Data: Statistics Portugal - Data for the Mainland.















Source of Census 2001 Data: Statistics Portugal - Data for the Mainland.
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Source of Census 2001 Data: Statistics Portugal - Data for the Mainland.
Table 4.1: District Magnitude Frequencies in the Sample
District Magnitude
2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 15 17 18 38 48 Missing Total




The reforms to the electoral system that have been proposed imply a change in the dimen-
sion of electoral circles. This section aims to understand the consequences on electoral
participation that might result from this resizing.
Our plan to achieve this goal is as follows. First, we aim to understand the way in which
district magnitude affects (or not) turnout. A first glance at aggregate data for 2002 and
2005 indicates a negative relationship between these variables (see Figure 5.1), but we
are not controlling for other variables that might be influencing this relationship. For a
proper test, we model the individual decision of voting or abstaining including district
magnitude as an explanatory variable to determine its relevance for this decision. Second,
we make predictions for different electoral scenarios to show the importance of this effect
in a possible resizing of electoral circles.




















Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 77-2/04/2002 and Number 47-8/03/2005
5.2 Literature Review
For decades, the idea that higher district magnitude encourages voter participation has
been an established rule in the study of electoral behavior (e.g., Powell Jr (1986) and
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Jackman (1987)). The argument is that large districts have more parties with electoral
chances of winning at least one seat and this provides the voter with an expanded choice
set, increasing the probability that one of the parties is a good match for him or her and
thereby decreasing the likelihood that none of the options is satisfactory (e.g. Cox (1997)
and Blais (2006)). For this reason, almost all research finds higher district magnitude to be
a key determinant encouraging voter turnout. Indeed, for Portugal, as Figure 5.2 shows,
there is a positive relationship between district magnitude and the number of viable
parties1. This provides voters with more viable choices in larger districts, potentially
decreasing abstention.
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District Magnitude
ff
Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 247-22/10/1999 and Number 77-2/04/2002
However, in recent years, this positive relationship between turnout and district mag-
nitude has been challenged. Brockington (2004) finds that when the number of viable
parties is higher, the creation of coalition governments and the increased complexity of the
decision making environment may depress turnout. Taagepera et al. (2013) showed that
there are two opposite forces - greater likelihood of finding a party close to one’s preferred
position and increased complexity of choice - that push in opposite directions as district
magnitude increases. Cunow (2013) finds that voters may find themselves overwhelmed
by choice and unable or unwilling to make choices when presented with many options.
1We define a viable party as a party that gained at least one seat in that district in the previous
election.
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Moreover, recent studies conclude that a large part of the empirical research can be chal-
lenged on methodological grounds (e.g. Monroe and Rose (2002) and Blais and Aarts
(2006)). These studies point out that most of the research uses the country as the unit of
analysis, combines presidential and legislative elections, does not control for the type of
electoral system and summarizes the distribution of district magnitude within the coun-
try using one single value such as the mean or the median, which may be problematic
when district magnitude varies largely within the country. Powell Jr (1986), Jackman
(1987), Jackman and Miller (1995) and Pérez-Liñán (2001) use a variable called “nation-
ally competitive election districts” that combines electoral formula and district magnitude:
“countries with national elections by proportional representation or a national pool for
some legislative districts or a simple national presidential vote are assigned a score of four;
those with proportional representation in large districts receive a score of three; countries
with proportional representation and three to five members per district are scored two;
and countries with single-member or winner take-all districts receive the lowest score of
one” (Jackman (1987)). This implies that for example Portugal, where district magnitude
ranges currently from 2 to 47, would be considered either a two or a three in this classifi-
cation, not fully reflecting its electoral system. Blais and Aarts (2006) also consider that,
for example, Spain receives “a dubious score of 3”.
Furthermore, in a proper test of the influence of district magnitude on abstention it is
necessary to control for individual-level characteristics to avoid ecological fallacies (see
Robinson (2009)). Thereby, in this study we will analyze the impact of district magni-
tude at the individual-level, taking advantage of the fact that we are able to examine
the behavior of electors of the same country who ought to have similar characteristics
(assuming those characteristics are based on the variables we control for) in different dis-
tricts with different magnitudes. And Portugal is a particularly well-suited case given
that district magnitude varies considerably over a meaningful range of values.
To our knowledge, there are very few empirical studies on the impact of district magnitude
on turnout that use individual-level data. One exception is the study of Jacobs and
Spierings (2010) that includes 32 districts of Dominican Republic and concludes that
district magnitude has a highly significant and negative effect on voter turnout. The
authors argue that this negative effect is caused by the stronger influence of clientelism in
smaller districts (politicians grant economic benefits such as the provision of pork-barrel
benefits in exchange for the vote or support of an individual).
For Portugal, to our knowledge there are several articles that use individual-level data
to study the impact of several variables on abstention (Magalhães (2001), Freire and
Magalhães (2002b), Viegas and Faria (2002) and Freire et al. (2007)) but they do not test
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the impact of district magnitude and use methodological and modeling choices that differ
from the ones in our analysis.
In sum, the impact of district magnitude on electoral turnout is not as well established in
research as it was some years ago and to our knowledge it has not yet been assessed for
Portugal. Because of the above-mentioned contradictory effects, it is not clear whether
we should expect the impact of district magnitude on turnout to be positive, negative, or
nonexistent. We use our rich database with individual-level data to make a contribution
to this debate and use our results to make predictions for alternative electoral scenarios.
5.3 Method
Our dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether the respondent has
abstained or not, which was constructed based on the answers given to the questions
about whether the individuals voted or not in the 2002 and 2005 elections.







The zero threshold is a normalization and it has no consequence since our vector of
regressors will include an intercept. Abstention∗ is unobservable and we assume that it
is linear so that it satisfies the following model:
Abstention∗ = x′β + υ (5.2)
where x includes the independent variables, β is a vector of regression coefficients and υ
is the error-term. For this reduced form, the probability that the individual abstains is
given by:
Pr(Abstention = 1) = Pr(x′β + υ > 0) = Pr(υ > −x′β) (5.3)
Assuming that υ follows a logistic distribution, (5.3) becomes:
Pr(Abstention = 1) = Λ(x′β) (5.4)




1 + ez (5.5)
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood (logit), with inference based on cluster-
robust standard errors, clustered by individual.
As independent variables, we use both individual-level variables and context-level vari-
ables. Individual-level variables are divided into four categories: individual characteristics,
institutional involvement, political variables and position towards issues. As context-level
variables, we use district magnitude, data on the rain in the district capital, a time
dummy, a measure of urbanization and regional dummies. Table A.1, in the appendix,
includes a detailed description and descriptive statistics of all variables. We follow the
approach of Jacobs and Spierings (2010) and include as a regressor at the individual level
the difference between aggregate turnout figures and the reported turnout in each district
to counter for over-reporting at district level.
Next section presents descriptive statistics.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
For both years, the proportion of abstainers in the sample is substantially lower than in
the official results (see Table 5.1), in line with what is common in election surveys (Selb
and Munzert (2013)).






Source of National Results: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 77-2/04/2002 and Number
47-8/03/2005
Table 5.2 breaks down abstention rates by individual’s closest party. In 2002, the largest
abstention rate is the one for individuals reporting feeling close to BE. For 2005, the
largest rate is the one for individuals reporting not feeling close to any party.
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Table 5.2: Abstention Rates by Closest Party
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS Other None
2002 28.0% 17.9% 12.7% 13.0% 14.0% 9.8% 26.6%
2005 19.8% 8.6% 8.3% 15.6% 9.7% 12.7% 24.1%
Figure 5.3 breaks down abstention rates by district magnitude in 2002 and 2005.






















Note: This graphic uses sample proportions. National results are presented in Figure 5.1. The
observations for Portalegre are not included in this graphic because the abstention rate in both
years is equal to 66.67%, which requires a large extension of the y-axis, reducing the clearness
of the results for the other districts.
Next section determines the best specification for the functional form of district magni-
tude.
5.5 District Magnitude Functional Form
The common specification of district magnitude in the literature is a logarithmic one.
This specification of functional form allows for some nonlinearity in the marginal effect
of district magnitude on abstention, meaning, for example, that we should expect a lower
impact when district magnitude changes from 25 to 26 when compared to the impact of
changing it from 5 to 6.
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However, given the recent theories that recognize that there are opposite forces affecting
turnout as we increase district magnitude, we start with a more general specification that
allows the relationship between abstention and district magnitude to show a reversal by
including both the logarithm of district magnitude and its inverse (Model 1). Then, we
test two other specifications: including only the inverse of district magnitude (Model 2)
and the commonly used logarithmic specification (Model 3). This allows us not to impose
a functional form a priori but rather to choose the one that best fits the data.
Instead of the logarithm of district magnitude, we use the logarithm of district magnitude
plus one because we will use our model to make predictions for districts of dimension one,
as this possibility incorporates one of the electoral reforms proposed for the Portuguese
system (Rodrigues et al. (2002) and Guedes et al. (2007)). The impact of this method-
ological choice is analyzed in the Sensitivity Analysis section.
The estimates for district magnitude obtained with the estimation of these three models2
are presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Logit Estimates- Models 1-3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
lnM 0.176 (0.457) — — -0.332* (0.195)
1/lnM 3.116 (2.529) 2.240** (1.072) — —
N=1728. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are omitted.
To choose between Models 1-3, we compute three measures that weight both the fit and
the parsimony of the model: the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), proposed in Akaike
(1998), the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (BIC), proposed in Schwarz et al.
(1978) and McFadden adjusted pseudo-r2 (McFadden (1974)).
The AIC is given by:
AIC = −2lnL + 2q (5.6)
where q is the number of parameters and lnL is the maximized log-likelihood.
The BIC is given by:
BIC = −2lnL + ln(n)q (5.7)
2STATA 12.0 is used to implement these models as well as all the statistical analysis throughout this
thesis.
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where n is the number of observations.





where lnLfull is the maximized log-likelihood of the full model and lnLintercept is the one
of the intercept-only model.
Results for these three measures are presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: AIC, BIC and McFadden Adjusted Pseudo-r2 - Models 1-3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AIC 1349.92 1348.12 1350.05
BIC 1584.47 1577.22 1579.15
McFadden Adjusted Pseudo-r2 0.064 0.066 0.064
Model 2 presents the lowest AIC and BIC and the highest McFadden adjusted pseudo-r2
and therefore we choose it to pursue our analysis. Next section presents the estimates
obtained for the whole model.
5.6 Results
The results from the estimation of Model 2 are presented in Table 5.5.











Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.528* (0.302)
Secondary 0.479* (0.289)
High or postgraduate -0.046 (0.359)
Married 0.155 (0.236)
Nº minors in the house -0.102 (0.120)
Catholic -0.193 (0.312)
Unemployed -0.202 (0.334)




Once a year -0.602* (0.313)
2-11x a year -0.257 (0.280)
1x or more a month -0.686** (0.314)
Once a week or more -0.803** (0.336)
Trade union member -0.523* (0.302)
Political Variables







Informed about politics -0.694** (0.317)
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 0.073*** (0.028)
Taxes 0.034 (0.035)





Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.189 (0.265)
Suburbs of large town or city 0.044 (0.314)
Large town or city 0.396 (0.299)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center -0.510 (0.314)





N=1728. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Before we proceed to the interpretation of coefficients, next section assesses more deeply
the model fit and diagnoses potential problems.
5.7 Model Diagnosis
Firstly, the log-likelihood chi-square test for global significance indicates that the model
as a whole is statistically significant with p < 0.0001.
Secondly, we compare predicted outcomes with actual outcomes to assess the fit of the






0 if Λ(x′β̂) ≤ 0.5
(5.9)
The percentage correctly classified is equal to 85.59%. Note, however, that as most of
the sample has Abstention = 0 (80.04%), then it is likely that Λ(x̂′β) ≤ 0.5 and hence
ˆAbstention =0 for most of the observations. Indeed, the model predicts that Abstention =
0 for 98.67% of the observations. This makes the specificity (the fraction of observed
Abstention = 0 cases that are correctly classified) very high (99.39%) and the sensitivity
(the fraction of observed Abstention = 1 cases that are correctly classified) very low
(5.51%).
Hence, more generally, a range of cutoff values may be considered. Figure 5.4 plots the
sensitivity and specificity values by probability cutoff (c). The point that maximizes their
sum is c = 0.140, which leads to a percentage correctly specified equal to 65.10%.













Figure 5.5 plots the receiver operating characteristics curve, which plots sensitivity versus
one minus specificity as the probability cutoff varies. A model with no predictive power
would be a 45º line. The greater the predictive power the more bowed the curve. The
area below the curve is used as a measure of predictive power that ranges from 0.5 (no
predictive power) to 1 (perfect model). For our model, the area is equal to 0.7515.
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Thirdly, we conduct the Lagrange multiplier test of generalized logit (Stukel (1988)) to
test for model misspecification. We consider as an alternative to the logit model the




1 + ehα(x′β) (5.10)
where hα(x′β) is a strictly increasing nonlinear function of x′β indexed by the shape pa-
rameters α1 and α2 that control, respectively, the heaviness of the tails and the symmetry
of the function Λα(.). To test for departure from the logit in the direction of an asym-
metric h-family, we add the regressor (x′β̂)2 and use a Lagrange multiplier test to test
whether this regressor significantly improves the fit of the model. The null hypothesis of
correct model specification is not rejected because the test for the added regressor yields
a χ2(1) statistic of 0.0 with p = 0.4622.
Fourthly, we perform the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test (Hosmer and
Lemesbow (1980)). We compare the average predicted probabilities n−1 ∑Λ(x′β̂) with
the sample frequency ȳ within groups based on the quantiles of the ordered predicted
probabilities. Let ¯̂pg and ȳg denominate, respectively, the average predicted probability







Under the null of correct specification, the statistic is distributed as χ2g−2. Even though
the choice of the number of groups is arbitrary, a common practice is to have 10 groups3.
We follow this practice and obtain p = 0.3220. Therefore, we do not reject the null of
correct model specification.
Finally, we test for collinearity problems. The model takes six iterations to converge
which is a signal that there is not a high degree of multicollinearity. Then, we compute
two interrelated collinearity diagnosis measures: the variance inflation factor and the
tolerance, given by:
V IF = 1
tolerance
(5.12)
tolerance = 1− r2j (5.13)
where r2j is the coefficient of determination of a regression of regressor j in all the other
regressors. Results are presented in the first two columns of Table A.2, in the appendix.
Only for age and its squared is the VIF larger than rule-of-thumb’s4 10 value and is the
tolerance less than 0.1. This is not problematic, as we can solve it by centering squared
age. Therefore, if we use (age −mean age)2 instead of age2, VIF and tolerance become
lower than the critical thresholds, as presented in the third and fourth columns of Table
A.2, in the appendix, and the coefficients and the standard errors of the other variables
(except the constant) remain the same.
Overall, results validate the adequacy of our model. In the next section, we interpret the
coefficients obtained.
5.8 Interpretation of Results
Even though our main focus is on the impact of district magnitude, we start with a
brief overview of the results obtained for the rest of the model to assess whether the
model is performing as expected in most of its variables and to give a picture of the
typical reasoning behind the decision to vote or abstain. Then, we interpret the results
for district magnitude.
3See Archer et al. (2007).
4See Neter et al. (1996).
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5.8.1 Controls
Regarding the impact of age, results show a curvilinear relationship between age and
abstention, with a negative significant effect of age on abstention and a positive significant
effect of age squared, in line with international studies (see Smets and Van Ham (2013)).
Hence, as Figure 5.6 shows, abstention is predicted to decrease with age at a decreasing
rate and to have a reversal when age is around 60. Freire and Magalhães (2002b), Viegas
and Faria (2002) and Freire et al. (2007) also found a negative relationship between age
and abstention for Portugal, but the possibility of a curvilinear relationship was not tested.
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Individuals with income between 751€ and 1500€ and more than 2500€ are less likely to
abstain than those with income between 0€ and 300€. Figure 5.7 shows the average pre-
dictions for each income class. This negative relationship between income and abstention
is in line with international studies (see Smets and Van Ham (2013)). For Portugal, Ma-
galhães (2001) concluded that, for 1999, this variable is not significant, but this variable
was treated as continuous, not exploring non-linear effects.
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Regarding the educational attainment variables, results show that the probability of ab-
staining is higher for individuals with basic or secondary education when compared with
individuals with no education or primary education. For individuals with high or post-
graduate education, the difference is not statistically significant for a significance level
lower than 10%. Figure 5.8 shows the average predictions for each education class. These
results go against our expectation that the more educated people are the less they abstain.
One possible explanation for this result is that people with more education perceive better
that their vote has a very little influence over the election outcome. This result explains
why turnout levels have not raised in advanced western democracies despite the rise of
educational attainment levels (Burden (2009)).
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For Portugal, Magalhães (2001), Viegas and Faria (2002) and Freire et al. (2007) found
that educational attainment is not significant to explain abstention and Freire and Magal-
hães (2002b) found a negative relationship. However, this variable is treated as continuous,
not looking into non-linear effects.
Public workers are potentially more affected by the decisions taken by the government.
So, as expected, we estimate that they are less likely to abstain: we estimate that the
probability of abstaining is 0.059 points lower. This is directionally in line with the results
of Corey and Garand (2002) for the US. For Portugal, this variable was not included in
the above-mentioned studies.
Attendance of church has, in general, a negative statistically significant impact on the
probability of abstaining (Figure 5.9 shows the average predictions for each category).
This result was to be expected since attendance of religious services builds civic skills that
are thought to promote civil commitment and stimulate political participation (Gerber
et al. (2008)). This result is in line with international studies (see Smets and Van Ham
(2013)) and with the conclusions of Viegas and Faria (2002) for Portugal. In the latter
study this variable is treated as continuous, not exploring for non-linear effects.
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Also, our findings indicate that belonging to a trade union has explanatory power. We
estimate the probability of abstention to be lower for trade union members in 0.052 points.
This was expected since unions emphasize values that are thought to mobilize citizens
(Radcliff and Davis (2000)) and this conclusion is in line with the results for Portugal
obtained by Freire and Magalhães (2002b), Viegas and Faria (2002) and Freire et al.
(2007). Most international studies do not find a statistically significant effect for this
variable (see Smets and Van Ham (2013)).
Of the political variables, individuals that report not being close to any party are more
likely to abstain than those that report being close to PS. Previous studies, both national
(Magalhães (2001), Freire and Magalhães (2002a), Viegas and Faria (2002) and Freire
et al. (2007)) and international (see Smets and Van Ham (2013)), have already found
a positive impact of not being close to any party on abstention. Being more informed
decreases the probability of abstention, in accordance with international studies (see Smets
and Van Ham (2013)).
Of the position towards issues variables, results show that the more individuals believe
that there should be more incentives for individual initiative, instead of a more equal
distribution of wealth, the more they abstain. This result is in line with our expectations,
since the less people attribute an important role to the government, the more they abstain
(in line with other studies, e.g. Brockington (2009)). This variable was not included in
previous national studies.
Finally, individuals that live in Alentejo are less likely to abstain than those that live in
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the North. To our knowledge, regional dummies were not included in previous studies for
Portugal.
5.8.2 District Magnitude
Figure 5.10 illustrates the effect of district magnitude on abstention, with predicted values
derived from the estimation of Model 2 and with all the regressors except the inverse of
district magnitude at the mean.
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The plot shows a diminishing returns (asymptotic) effect. Indeed, there is a steep decline
in the probability of abstention as district magnitude increases followed by a flattening
out of this relationship.
This shape indicates that the vast bulk of improvements in electoral participation can
be realized with quite modest district magnitudes, meaning that districts of moderate
size can allow for relatively low abstention rates while bearing relatively fewer of the
costs associated to very large districts (for example in terms of the so-discussed distance
between the elected and the electors).
5.9 Predictions
In order to estimate the effects of potential electoral reforms on turnout, we compare
abstention outcomes under five different scenarios.
27
Our reference is the current system. Then, we make predictions for four hypothetical
scenarios. First, we consider a system where all circles have the same magnitude, equal
to the mean magnitude (uniform circles), a theoretical scenario that enables us to assess
the impact of the nonuniformity of district magnitude. Second, given the proposals to
decrease the MPs to 180, we compute the hypothetical MPs in each circle under this
scenario using the D’Hondt formula (the new distribution of district magnitude is detailed
in Figure A.1, in the appendix) and we predict the impact on the mean probability of
abstention. Third, given the proposals that comprise a national circle and single-member
circles, we also consider these scenarios. Caution should be taken in the interpretation
of these last two scenarios since we are making out-of-sample predictions of substantial
changes to the current electoral system.
The mean predicted probability of abstention in the five scenarios is given in Table 5.6.
The distributions of the predicted probability of abstention are plotted in Figure 5.11,
which groups individuals together vertically (as in a histogram) according to their pre-
dicted probability of abstention.
Table 5.6: Mean Predicted Pr(Abstention) Under the Alternative Scenarios




























Firstly, results show that the mean probability of abstention is higher under the uniform
circles system than under the current system. This means that the current heterogeneity
in the dimension of electoral circles (that results from different amounts of electors across
districts) leads to a lower mean probability of abstention than the one that would hold
in a theoretical system where all districts have the same magnitude.
Secondly, the 180 MPs scenario also leads to a higher mean predicted probability of ab-
stention than the current system. This was to be expected given the negative relationship
that we have found between the probability of abstention and district magnitude. In-
deed, with a decrease on the number of MPs there is a decrease of the average district
magnitude which has a negative impact on abstention.
Thirdly, under the national circle scenario, the mean predicted probability of abstention
decreases substantially, which again was to be expected given the negative relationship
we have found between abstention and district magnitude.
Finally, under a scenario with single-member circles, the mean predicted probability
of abstention increases dramatically. As expected, these circles “stimulate” abstention
(VV.AA. (1998d)). However, the result is too extreme most likely due to the small num-
ber of observations available for very small districts.5
5For Portalegre, with district magnitude equal to 2 in 2002 and equal to 3 in 2005, we only have
3 individuals and a sample abstention rate of 66.66%. Note, however, that these observations are not
influencing the negative relationship previously found between abstention and district magnitude as the
coefficient of the inverse of district magnitude remains significant and positive when we exclude them
from the estimation of the model (see the Sensitivity Analysis section).
29
Hence, results indicate that a system with uniform circles, a reduction of the MPs to 180
and single-member circles would have a negative impact on turnout. A national circle,
on the other hand, would have a positive impact.
5.10 Sensitivity Analysis
In our estimated model, we use the inverse of district magnitude plus one instead of
the inverse of district magnitude because of our intention of using the model to make
predictions for districts of dimension one. We show that this choice has no substantial
implications for our conclusions. Indeed, when we estimate the model using the inverse
of district magnitude, the coefficients of the control variables are similar (see Table A.3,
in the appendix) as well as the impact of district magnitude, even though, for small
districts, the difference between the mean predicted probability of abstention between
the two models is larger (see Figure 5.12).
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Secondly, given the small number of observations available in our dataset for Portalegre,
we estimate our model excluding this district. The coefficients of the control variables are
similar (see Table A.4, in the appendix) and for district magnitude the mean predicted
probability of abstention is slightly smaller for very small districts (see Figure 5.13).
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Finally, we estimate the model assuming that υ in (5.2) is standard normal distributed
(probit). Then (5.4) is replaced by:
Pr(Abstention = 1) = Φ(x′β) (5.14)
where Φ(.) is the cdf of the standard normal.
The models yield quite different estimates for the regression coefficients since different
formulas are used for the probabilities. To make them comparable, we compute the
marginal effects at the mean as these are scaled similarly across models.
The marginal effects, with respect to a change in the continuous regressor xj, evaluated











For the dummy variables, the marginal effect is the the discrete change in the predicted
probability of Abstention = 1, as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
Results are presented in Table A.5, in the appendix. As often is the case6, there is little
6See Cameron and Trivedi (2009): page 472.
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difference between these models. In particular for district magnitude, the mean predicted
probability of abstention is very similar across models (see Figure 5.14), even though it
is slightly lower for very small districts when the probit model is used. Since the models
have the same number of parameters, the natural metric to compare them is the fitted
log-likelihood. The probit model has a log likelihood of -631.90 which is 0.16 lower than
the -632.06 for the logit, favoring the probit model but suggesting little additional gain
to using one model rather than the other.























We have proposed a model that explains the individual decision of voting or abstaining.
Most of the control variables perform as was theoretically expected, confirming previous
knowledge and illuminating new aspects of the electoral behavior of the Portuguese.
In terms of the impact of district magnitude, we have found that a larger district mag-
nitude encourages electoral participation and quantified this relationship. We have con-
cluded that there is a steep decrease in the probability of abstaining as district magnitude
increases followed by a flattening out of this relationship. This means that districts of
moderate size can allow for relatively low abstention rates while bearing relatively fewer
of the costs associated to very large districts (for example in terms of the so-discussed
distance between the elected and the electors).
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We have also tested a specification that allows for a reversal point but the fit of the model
is lower, indicating that there is not a point where the increased complexity of the decision
making environment outweighs the incentives created by a higher probability of finding a
party close to one’s position.
Then, we have made predictions for four alternative electoral scenarios to shed light on the
consequences on abstention of potential electoral reforms that imply a resizing of electoral
circles. We have shown that the heterogeneity in terms of district magnitude leads to a
lower mean probability of abstention than the one that would hold in a theoretical system
where all districts have the same magnitude. For the reduction to 180 MPs, we have
estimated an increase in the mean probability of abstention and we have quantified it.
Next, even though we are aware that our method is not the most accurate to make
predictions for national and single-member circles, since the smaller district in our sample
has 2 seats and the largest has 48, we have made out-of-sample predictions that give us
a rough measure of the potential consequences of these scenarios on abstention. Results
indicate that a national circle would decrease the mean probability of abstention and
single-member circles would increase it dramatically. For the latter we have obtained
an extreme result that we believe can be justified by the small number of observations
available in our dataset for very small districts. Ideally, one would need a larger sample
or a survey that oversamples individuals in these districts.
All in all, our findings have one substantial implication: district magnitude influences the
probability of abstaining and therefore this change in the behavior of electors should not
be disregarded in electoral engineering debates.
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6 Vote Sincerely/Strategically Decision
6.1 Introduction
Literature on voting behavior has shown that voters may find it rational to vote for a
party other than the most preferred one in order to avoid wasting their vote in a party
with no viable chances of being elected to parliament. Such voters are traditionally called
“strategic voters”.
Given that district magnitude is a critical determinant of the number of viable parties
(Taagepera and Shugart (1989)), we expect it to influence the decision to vote sincerely
or strategically. The idea is as follows: in small districts, voters that have as favorite
party a party that is not viable may defect from it and instead vote for a viable party
with prospects of gaining a seat. In contrast, in large districts with more viable parties,
most voters may simply vote for their preferred party. A key implication is that, as the
proposed electoral reforms imply a resizing of electoral districts, they can potentially have
an impact on whether people vote for their favorite party or not.
In order to study the strategic electoral behavior of the Portuguese and its implications,
we proceed in a similar way as for the vote/abstain decision. First, we aim to understand
whether district magnitude affects (or not) the decision to vote sincerely or strategically.
Then we illustrate the implications of this relationship for the proposed electoral reforms.
6.2 Literature Review
Duverger’s Law (Duverger et al. (1954)) highlights the importance of strategic voting
under first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems, such as those in the US and in the UK, where
there is only one winner per district: the candidate with the most votes. His argument
is that voters do not simply take into account their preferences but also the expectation
about the outcome of the election, for instance whether their most preferred candidate is
actually a viable alternative in their electoral district. This, as Duverger argues, depresses
the chances of “third” parties.
Duverger thought that strategic voting would not emerge under Proportional Represen-
tation (PR) systems, such as the Portuguese one, since these systems distribute the avail-
able seats in proportion to each party’s votes. Following the same reasoning, Bowler and
Lanoue (1992) mention that “under proportional representation, voters can help “their”
party by voting for it under any circumstances; thus, voting sincerely is a dominant
strategy”.
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Contrarily to these views, Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968) argue that strategic voting is
significant under PR systems, but only in districts with a magnitude lower than five.
The argument is that in districts larger than five the percentages that separate winners
from losers are smaller and therefore the informational requirements needed to become
confident that a particular party is out of the running in the upcoming election become
too high. As a result, in PR systems with large district magnitudes strategic voting should
not be an empirically relevant phenomenon. This hypothesis was validated later by Cox
(1994) and Cox and Shugart (1996) that analyze Japanese and Japanese and Colombian
aggregate data, respectively.
However, recent research has challenged these conclusions. Forsythe et al. (1993), Gschwend
(2007) and Lago (2008) conclude that strategic votes can also be cast in large districts
because voters only need to know if the party they prefer has some chance of winning at
least one seat in their district and for that they only need to look back to the previous
election, which is not harder for voters in large districts.
Given the diversity in findings, it is not clear whether we should expect district magnitude
to impact the decision to vote sincerely or strategically in PR systems and whether there
is a cutoff point. To our knowledge this impact has not yet been assessed for Portugal,
with the exception of Gschwend (2007) that, using aggregate data, concludes that parties
that did not gain any seat in the previous election are likely to have a lower percentage
of votes in the next election and shows that this effect is weaker in larger districts.
As Portugal has quite a wide range of district magnitude, at this point it is relevant to
take advantage of that and assess the impact of district magnitude within the country
using our rich individual-level data, avoiding problems from cross-national pooling and
from the use of aggregate data. Moreover, to our knowledge there is not any study
for Portugal that examines individual-level factors that might influence the probability
of voting sincerely or not. Hence, the analysis of our control variables is an important
contribution to the understanding of other factors, besides district magnitude, that might
influence this decision.
The detailed methodology used in our analysis is explained in the next section.
6.3 Method
Our dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether the voter has voted
sincerely or not. To construct this variable, we compare the answer given by the respon-
dent to the question about whether she usually thinks of herself as close to any particular
party (and if yes, which party) with the party the respondent declares having voted for.
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Hence, we will consider that a voter is sincere if she votes for the the party that she
reports feeling close to7; otherwise, the voter is considered strategic. This terminology
is not uniform across studies. For example, Felsenthal and Brichta (1985) emphasize the
process and not the outcome: a strategic voter is one that takes into consideration how
others are likely to vote and strategic voters are those that are not interested in other
voters’ preferences and probable decisions. Blais and Nadeau (1996), Blais et al. (2001)
and Blais et al. (2005) define a strategic voter as one that does not vote for the preferred
alternative and is motivated by the intention to affect the outcome of the election.
What we want to study is the individual decision to be a sincere or a strategic voter. (6.1)






Sincere∗ is unobservable and we assume that it is linear so that it satisfies the following
model:
Sincere∗ = x′β + υ (6.2)
where x includes the independent variables, β is a vector of regression parameters and υ
is the error-term. The probability that the individual votes sincerely is given by:
Pr(Sincere = 1) = Pr(x′β + υ > 0) = Pr(υ > −x′β) (6.3)
Assuming that υ follows a logistic distribution, :
Pr(Sincere = 1) = Λ(x′β) (6.4)
where Λ(.) is the logistic cdf with:
Λ(z) = e
z
1 + ez (6.5)
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood (logit), with inference based on cluster-
robust standard errors, clustered by individual.
As controls, we use both individual-level variables and context-level variables. Table A.6,
in the appendix, includes a detailed description and descriptive statistics of all variables.
7When the individual reports feeling close to more than one party, we use the party that she feels
closest to among those parties.
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Next section presents descriptive statistics.
6.4 Descriptive Statistics
We present our dependent variable broken down by three factors: year, closest party and
district magnitude.
The proportion of sincere voters is equal to 85.9% in 2002 and 87.6% in 2005. Breaking
down by closest party (Table 6.1) the proportion of sincere voters is relatively high for
individuals that feel close to one of the two major parties, which is expected since these
individuals have less incentives to use strategic voting options (Felsenthal and Brichta
(1985) and Duch and Palmer (2002)). Surprisingly, in 2005 the proportion of sincere
voters for individuals that feel close to CDS-PP is higher than the one for individuals
that feel close to PPD-PSD. The proportion of sincere voters for individuals that feel
close to one of the residual parties is very low, which is expected given that these parties
are not viable in any district (see Table 6.2).
Table 6.1: Proportion of Sincere Voters by Closest Party
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS Other
2002 63.1% 80.4% 81.8% 98.7% 93.7% 0%
2005 77.3% 93.4% 84.6% 90.4% 96.5% 4.8%
Table 6.2: Number of Districts (in the Mainland) in Which Parties are Viable
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS Other
2002 1 9 7 17 18 0
2005 2 8 6 17 18 0
ff
Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 247-22/10/1999 and Number 77-2/04/2002
Breaking down by district magnitude, there is not a clear relationship between sincere
voting and district magnitude (see Figure 6.1). However, several factors might be con-
taminating this two-way analysis. Therefore, we will make a proper test, controlling for
several variables, to determine whether district magnitude influences the probability of
voting sincerely or not.
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Next section determines the best specification for the functional form of district magni-
tude.
6.5 District Magnitude Functional Form
As for the vote/abstain decision, we estimate three different models to determine the best
functional form for district magnitude.
We start with a more general specification that allows the relationship between sincere
voting and district magnitude to show a reversal by including both the logarithm of
district magnitude and its inverse (Model 1). Model 2 includes only the inverse of district
magnitude, allowing for a steep increase in sincere voting as district magnitude increases
while district magnitude is below a given level (potentially 5) and a flat curve afterward.
Finally, we estimate the common specification in the literature: a logarithmic one (Model
3). Again, we use the logarithm of district magnitude plus one because we will use our
model to make predictions for districts of dimension one.
The estimates for district magnitude obtained with the estimation of these three models
are presented in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Logit Estimates - Models 1-3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
lnM -0.674 (0.844) — — 0.566* (0.328)
1/lnM -7.871* (4.731) -4.243** (1.792) — —
N=719. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are omitted.
The computation of the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC) and McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-r2 (see Table 6.4) indicates that
Model 2 is the most appropriate model. Therefore we choose it to pursue our analysis.
Table 6.4: AIC, BIC and McFadden Adjusted Pseudo-r2 - Models 1-3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AIC 424.48 423.15 425.15
BIC 607.60 601.69 603.69
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo-r2 0.244 0.246 0.243
Next section presents the logit estimates and standard errors obtained with the estimation
of Model 2.
6.6 Results
The results obtained with the estimation of Model 2 are presented in Table 6.5.
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic -0.750 (0.548)
Secondary -1.043* (0.559)
High or postgraduate -1.172* (0.626)
Married 0.057 (0.458)
Nº minors in the house 0.128 (0.246)
Catholic -1.286* (0.742)
Unemployed 0.194 (0.631)
Public worker 0.822* (0.476)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -1.053* (0.620)
2-11x a year -0.289 (0.624)
1x or more a month -0.578 (0.641)
Once a week or more -0.576 (0.664)
Trade union member 0.555 (0.484)
Political Variables






Informed about politics 1.540*** (0.536)
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality -0.071 (0.054)
Taxes 0.066 (0.067)




Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.946* (0.483)
Suburbs of large town or city -2.160*** (0.588)
Large town or city -1.357*** (0.486)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 1.176** (0.515)




N=719. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Before moving to the interpretation of these coefficients, next section assesses more deeply
the model fit and diagnoses potential problems.
6.7 Model Diagnosis
Firstly, the log-likelihood chi-square test for global significance indicates that the model
as a whole is statistically significant with p < 0.0001.
Secondly, we compare predicted outcomes with actual outcomes. When we use as cutoff
value c = 0.5, the percentage correctly classified is equal to 92.35%. However, as most of
the sample has Sincere = 1 (86.80%), it is likely that Λ(x′β̂) > 0.5 and hence ˆSincere =1
for most of the observations. Indeed, the model predicts that Sincere = 1 for 93.32% of
the observations. This makes the specificity (the fraction of observed Sincere = 0 cases
that are correctly classified) relatively low (46.32%) and the sensitivity (the fraction of
observed Sincere = 1 cases that are correctly classified) very high (99.36%). Hence, more
generally, a range of cutoff values may be considered. Figure 6.2 plots the sensitivity and
specificity values by probability cutoff. The point that maximizes their sum is c = 0.814,
which leads to a percentage correctly specified equal to 86.93%.













Figure 6.3 plots the receiver operating characteristics curve. For our model, the area
below it is equal to 0.8687.
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Thirdly, we conduct the Stukel Lagrange multiplier test of generalized logit. The null
hypothesis of correct model specification is not rejected because the test yields a χ2(1)
statistic of 0.66 with p = 0.4162.
Fourthly, we perform the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test. We use 10 groups
and obtain p = 0.8466. Therefore, we do not reject the null of correct specification.
Finally, we test for collinearity problems. The model takes seven iterations to converge
which is a signal that there is not a high degree of multicollinearity. Coefficients for
tolerance and VIF are presented in the first two columns of Table A.7, in the appendix.
Only for age and its squared is the VIF larger than rule-of-thumb’s 10 value and is the
tolerance less than 0.1. This is not problematic, as we can solve it by centering squared
age, as presented in the third and fourth columns of Table A.7, in the appendix.
Overall, results support the adequacy of our model. In the next section, we interpret the
coefficients obtained.
6.8 Interpretation of Results
We start with a brief overview of the results obtained for the controls to assess whether
the model is performing as expected and to give a picture of the typical reasoning behind




Individuals with secondary or high or postgraduate education are less likely to vote sin-
cerely than those with none or primary education. Figure 6.4 shows the average pre-
dictions for each education class. These results are directionally in line with numerous
studies that have argued that those with more education are more likely to vote strate-
gically (e.g. Felsenthal and Brichta (1985), Duch and Palmer (2002) and Merolla and
Stephenson (2007)) since strategic voting requires some knowledge and analytical skills
to understand the mechanics of the voting system and how votes may be wasted.
















None or Primary Basic Secondary High or Postgraduate
Education
Catholic individuals are less likely to vote sincerely: we estimate that the probability of
voting sincerely is 0.074 points lower (directionally in line with Merolla and Stephenson
(2007)). Public workers are more likely to vote sincerely (0.048 points).
Of the institutional involvement variables, we estimate that individuals that attend reli-
gious services once a year are less likely to vote sincerely (0.064 points) than those that
never attend.
Of the political variables, individuals that report feeling close to BE, CDU and the resid-
ual parties are less likely to vote sincerely when compared to individuals that report being
close to PS. Figure 6.5 shows the average predictions for each party. As expected, individ-
uals that feel close to one of the two major parties have higher mean predicted probabilities
of voting sincerely since these individuals have less incentives to use strategic voting op-
tions (in line with Felsenthal and Brichta (1985) and Duch and Palmer (2002)). This
43
probability is lower for individuals that feel close to BE and CDU, the two parties that,
after the residual parties, have the smallest number of districts in which they are viable
(see Table 6.2). Surprisingly, for CDS-PP this probability is similar to the one of the two
major parties. For the residual parties, as expected, the mean predicted probability of
sincere voting is very low since they are not viable in any district.

















BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS Other
Closest Party
More informed individuals are more likely to vote sincerely (the probability is 0.089 points
higher). This result may seem counter-intuitive since one would expect more informed
individuals to be more apt to identify situations in which their vote would be wasted
(Duch and Palmer (2002) and Lawrence (2003)). However, these individuals are also
likely to be more sensitive to the costs or benefits of voting and more likely to understand
that their vote has no impact over the election outcome.
Of the position towards issues variable, results show that the more individuals believe
that there should be an increase of citizen participation in government decision making,
the more they vote sincerely.
Of the context-level controls, we estimate that the probability of voting sincerely is higher
in 2005 (0.032 points). Individuals that live in a rural area or village are more likely to
vote sincerely (directionally in line with Spenkuch (2013)) . Individuals that live in the
Center, Lisbon and Tagus Valley or Alentejo are more likely to vote sincerely than those
that live in the North. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the average predictions by degree of
urbanization and region, respectively.
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6.8.2 District Magnitude
Figure 6.8 illustrates the impact of district magnitude on the probability of voting sin-
cerely, with predicted values derived from the estimation of Model 2 with all regressors
except the inverse of district magnitude at the mean.
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There is a steep increase in the probability of voting sincerely as district magnitude
increases followed by a flattening out of this relationship. Contrarily to previous research,
our results do not indicate that strategic voting vanishes when district magnitude is
larger than five. For example when district magnitude is equal to ten we estimate that
the mean probability of voting strategically is still equal to 12.05%. Note, however, that
as aforementioned, the definition of strategic voting differs across studies.
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6.9 Predictions
In order to estimate the effects of potential reforms to the electoral system on sincere
voting, we compare the mean predicted probability of sincere voting under the same
scenarios as in the vote/abstain decision.
The mean predicted probability of voting sincerely in the five scenarios is given in Table
6.6. The distributions of the predicted probability of voting sincerely are plotted in Figure
6.9. Again, it is important to reinforce that caution should be taken in the interpretation
of the last two scenarios since we are making out-of-sample predictions of substantial
changes to the current electoral system.
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Table 6.6: Mean Predicted Pr(Sincere Vote) Under the Alternative Scenarios




























Firstly, results show that the mean probability of sincere voting is lower under the uniform
circles system. Under this theoretical system, we no longer have both very large districts
with higher probabilities of sincere voting and very small ones with lower probabilities.
The first effect dominates and the mean probability decreases.
Secondly, the 180 MPs scenario also leads to a lower mean probability of sincere voting
(similar to the one of the uniform circles scenario). This was to be expected given the
positive relationship that we have found between the probability of sincere voting and
district magnitude: as circles become smaller, the mean probability of sincere voting
decreases.
Thirdly, under the national circle scenario, the mean probability of sincere voting in-
creases, which again was to be expected given the positive relationship between sincere
voting and district magnitude. This result goes in line with our expectations and with
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those of Rodrigues et al. (2002) that refer the possibility of circumventing strategic voting
as one of the reasons for the creation of a national circle.
Finally, under a scenario with single-member circles, the mean probability of sincere voting
dramatically decreases. As expected, this scenario stimulates tactical voting (VV.AA.
(1998b) and VV.AA. (1998c)) but the magnitude of the effect is too extreme. As for
the vote/abstain decision, we believe that it can be explained by the small number of
observations available for very small districts8.
6.10 Sensitivity Analysis
We start by revisiting our model using the inverse of the logarithm of district magnitude
instead of the inverse of the logarithm of district magnitude plus one. Results show
that this has no substantial implications for our conclusions. Indeed, the coefficients of
the control variables are similar (see Table A.8, in the appendix) as well as the impact
of district magnitude (see Figure 6.10), even though, for small districts, the difference
between the mean predicted probability of sincere voting between the two models is
larger.
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ln(MPs+1) ln(MPs)
8In this case, the estimation is not even including the 3 individuals that belong to Portalegre because
some of the required information for the estimation of the model is not available and therefore these
observations are deleted (listwise deletion).
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Secondly, we estimate the model assuming that υ in (6.2) is standard normal distributed
(probit). Then (6.4) is replaced by:
Pr(Sincere = 1) = Φ(x′β) (6.6)
where Φ(.) is the cdf of the standard normal.
To make the estimates comparable to our previously estimated model, we compute the
marginal effects at the mean. Results are presented in Table A.9, in the appendix, and
show little difference between the models. In particular for district magnitude, the mean
predicted probability of sincere voting is very similar across models (see Figure 6.11).
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Finally, we test whether the probit model is better than the logit. The logit model has a
log likelihood of -172.58 which is 1.21 higher than the -173.79 for the probit, which favors
the logit model but suggests little additional gain to using one model rather than the
other.
6.11 Discussion and Policy Recommendations
The impact of district magnitude on the vote sincerely/strategically decision is very similar
to the impact on the vote/abstain decision, as distilled more clearly in Figure 6.12.
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This result has a key implication: it is possible to have a relatively low level of abstention
and strategic voting while bearing relatively fewer of the costs associated to very large
districts, for example in terms of the so-discussed distance between the elected and the
electors.
Note, however, that strategic voting is not necessarily an undesirable property of an
electoral system, given that, for example, it can have a positive effect on governmental
stability. Notwithstanding, if policy makers want to minimize it and increase the degree
to which the vote is anchored in the preferences of individuals, then results indicate that
it is possible to achieve a relatively low level of strategic voting with circles with a quite
moderate magnitude - such as the ones of Santarém and Leiria -, avoiding the problems
of lack of proximity and accountability associated to circles of very large magnitudes such
the ones of Lisbon and Porto.
Hence, even though we recognize that there is no such thing as an ideal district magnitude,
our results indicate that for these two variables the trade-off is not linear. This result
adds to the result of Rae (1971), which states that the increase in proportionality with
the increase in district magnitude is curvilinear and beyond a district magnitude equal to
20 it tends to zero, suggesting that one does not need very large districts to capture most
of the proportionality gains. Also, Carey and Hix (2011) find a curvilinear relationship
between district magnitude and favorable outcomes (proportionality, accountability and
short ideological distance between voters and the government), with sharp increases in
the probability of these outcomes when district magnitude is below five.
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6.12 Conclusions
We have proposed a model that explains the individual decision of voting sincerely or not.
Several measures of model fit and diagnosis validate its adequacy.
The analysis of our control variables is, to our knowledge, the first contribution for Portu-
gal to the understanding of individual-level factors that might explain the decision to vote
sincerely or strategically. We have shown that individual characteristics (education, reli-
gion and whether the individual is a public worker), institutional involvement (attendance
of religious services), political variables (closest party and being informed about politics),
position towards issues variables (position of the respondent towards government decision
making) and context-level variables (year, degree of urbanization and region) have an
impact on this decision.
In terms of the impact of district magnitude, we have concluded that there is a sharp in-
crease in the level of sincere voting as district magnitude increases followed by a flattening
out of this relationship. This result, together with the results obtained in this study for
the vote/abstain decision and with the results of previous studies that have shown curvi-
linear relationships between district magnitude and proportionality, accountability and
short ideological distance between voters and the government, suggests that the trade-off
between different facets of alternative electoral systems is not linear.
Contrarily to previous research, we have not concluded that strategic voting disappears
when district magnitude is larger than five. However, one needs to take into account that
the definition of strategic voting differs across studies.
Then, we have made predictions for the same alternative electoral scenarios as in the
vote/abstain decision in order to shed light on the consequences of potential electoral
reforms that imply a resizing of electoral circles on sincere voting. We have shown that
the heterogeneity in terms of district magnitude leads to a higher mean probability of
sincere voting than in a theoretical system where all districts have the same magnitude.
Also, we have shown that the so discussed reduction of MPs to 180 decreases the mean
probability of sincere voting and quantified it.
Our out-of-sample predictions of a national circle and single-member circles give us a
rough measure of the potential consequences of these scenarios on sincere voting. Results
indicate that a national circle would increase sincere voting and single-member circles
would decrease it dramatically. As for the vote/abstain decision, the result for single-
member circles is extreme, which we believe that can be explained by the small number
of observations available in our dataset for very small districts.
Altogether, this section contributes to the understanding of the typical reasoning behind
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the decision of voting sincerely or not and shows that, besides several other factors,
district magnitude is a significant variable. This indicates that redistricting exercises
have an impact on sincere voting and therefore this effect should not be disregarded in
the debate about potential electoral reforms.
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7 Party Choice Decision
7.1 Introduction
The analysis conducted in the previous section showed a positive relationship between
district magnitude and sincere voting. The purpose of this section is to measure the
implied consequences on parties votes.
Our plan to achieve this goal is as follows. First, we aim to understand whether district
magnitude has an impact on the choice of electors among parties. Figure 7.1 gives us
a first idea about how district magnitude and parties vote shares are interrelated by
presenting the vote shares of each of the five main parties, in the mainland, in the 2002
and 2005 elections (as a percentage of the sum of votes of these main parties in the
mainland). This two-way graphics show a positive relationship between BE’s vote share
and district magnitude. For the other parties, there is not a clear relationship between
the variables. Note, however, that this bivariate relationships only gives us a first hint of
how these variables are interrelated since we are not controlling for other variables that
might be influencing this relationship. Hence, in our analysis, we use our rich dataset to
develop a model of vote choice that includes district magnitude as an explanatory variable
and controls for several variables that might contaminate these relationships. Second, we
illustrate the implications for the reforms that have been proposed to the electoral system.
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Source: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 77-2/04/2002 and Number 47-8/03/2005
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7.2 Literature Review
Choice is a fundamental topic in political science, but models that incorporate more than
two alternatives began to appear only in the 1990s. Born (1990) introduced the nested
logit multinomial model, Whitten and Palmer (1996) the multinomial logit model and
Alvarez and Nagler (1998) the multinomial probit model.
Previous research uses these models to explain vote choice but typically does not include
district magnitude as an independent variable. One exception is Monroe and Rose (2002),
a study that, using district-level vote results, develops a model of vote shares for Portugal
using the logarithm of population density, the logarithm of district magnitude and a
dummy variable for the region Alentejo as covariates. Portugal is chosen due to its large
degree of variation in district magnitude and to the absence of regional parties; indeed,
the authors refer that an ideal analysis would require “a pure DPR system with many
districts, with an identical list of competing parties in each district, and relevant covariate
data at the district level”. However, we identify two fragile points in this analysis: the
use of aggregate data and the inclusion of a small number of controls given the sample
size (n=20). In our study, we overcome these points with the use of individual-level data
and by including more covariates (which is possible given our larger sample size and their
availability in our rich dataset).
With respect to other determinants of the electoral behavior of the Portuguese, Freire
(2002), Jalali (2002), Lobo (2002), Freire (2005), Lobo (Lobo), Jalali (2007) and Lobo
(2007) outlined fundamental traits about the way the Portuguese vote. These studies
do not include district magnitude as explanatory variable and use methodological and
modeling choices that differ from the ones in our analysis.
Hence, our study fulfills a need as it uses individual-level data to assess the impact of
district magnitude on the parties votes and models the consequences of potential electoral
reforms that imply changes in the dimension of electoral circles. We also complement the
literature on other determinants of vote choice of the Portuguese.
Next section explains the method used in our analysis.
7.3 Method
Our dependent variable is a categorical variable which consists of the party that indi-
viduals report having voted for in the 2002 and 2005 elections. We exclude the residual
group that includes votes for parties that have never gained a seat, because these parties
do not compete in all districts, their electoral support is tiny (resulting in a small number
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of observations (n=33), which would make the results of our estimates unstable) and we
do not know for which party had the voters who reported voting for this group (that
includes very heterogeneous parties in terms of ideology and left-right location) voted for.
Therefore, our analysis focuses in the choice between the five main parties that have been
competing in all districts. With this methodological choice, rather than investigating
complete voter choice, we investigate choice from among the five main parties.
We use an additive random utility framework to model the vote choice decision. For
individual i, the utility of the jth party is specified to be given by:
Uij = Vij + εij j = 1, 2, ..., 5 (7.1)
where Vij denotes the deterministic component of utility and εij denotes the random
component of utility. The deterministic component is specified as:
Vij = xiβj (7.2)
where xi is a vector of case-specific regressors of the ith individual and βj contains the
regression coefficients.
Suppressing the individual subscript i for notational simplicity, the chosen party is the
one that yields the highest utility so that:
Pr(y = j) = Pr(Uj ≥ Uk , all k 6= j) = Pr(Uk − Uj ≤ 0 , all k 6= j) (7.3)
Using (7.1), (7.3) becomes:
Pr(y = j) = Pr(εk − εj ≤ Vj − Vk , all k 6= j) (7.4)
If we assume that the errors εj are iid and follow a type 1 extreme value distribution with
density given by
f(εj) = e−εjexp(−e−εj) j = 1, 2, ..., 5 (7.5)
, then it can be shown9 that (7.4) yields
Pr(y = j) = e
Vj




j = 1, 2, ..., 5 (7.6)
9See Cameron and Trivedi (2009): page 486
56
(7.6) gives the probability of choosing party j and is estimated by maximum likelihood
(multinomial logit).
To ensure identification, βj is set to zero for one of the categories: the base category. We
choose PS as the base category since it has the largest support in our dataset. Inference
is based on cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by individual.
We use individual characteristics, institutional involvement variables and context-level
variables as independent variables. Table A.10, in the appendix, includes a detailed de-
scription and descriptive statistics of all variables. Contrarily to the previous sections,
we do not include political variables and position towards issues variables to avoid endo-
geneity problems that are very likely to result from the inclusion of these variables.
Next section presents descriptive statistics.
7.4 Descriptive Statistics
This section makes a brief analysis of our dependent variable.
First, we compare the voting percentages in our dataset with the national results in the
mainland (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). In both years, the percentage of votes of BE, CDU and
PS is larger in the sample than in the national results. The opposite holds for CDS-PP
and PPD-PSD.






















Source of National Results: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 77-2/04/2002
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Source of National Results: Official Gazette 1st Series A - Number 47-8/03/2005
Figure 7.4 presents vote proportions (in the sample) by district magnitude.
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Note: These graphics use sample proportions. National results are presented in Figure 7.1.
Next section determines the best specification for the functional form of district magnitude
to use in our analysis.
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7.5 District Magnitude Functional Form
As for the previous sections, we estimate three different models to assess the impact of
district magnitude on the vote choice. We start with Model 1 that includes both the
logarithm of district magnitude and its inverse. Model 2 only includes the inverse of
district magnitude and Model 3 only includes the logarithm of district magnitude. Once
again we use the logarithm of district magnitude plus one because we will use our model
to make predictions for districts of dimension one.
The estimates for district magnitude obtained with the estimation of these three models
are presented in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Multinomial Logit Estimates- Models 1-3
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD
Model 1
lnM -0.962 (0.717) -0.779 (0.668) -0.288 (0.604) -0.309 (0.409)
1/lnM -10.147** (4.869) -5.519 (3.748) -1.025 (3.689) -2.280 (2.398)
Model 2
1/lnM -4.297** (1.771) -1.267 (1.702) 0.503 (1.566) -0.623 (0.973)
Model 3
lnM 0.429 (0.273) 0.063 (0.298) -0.124 (0.259) 0.049 (0.166)
N=1647. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables are omitted.
The computation of the Akaike’s information criterion, Schwarz’s Bayesian information
criterion and McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-r2 (see Table 7.2) indicates that Model 2 is
the most appropriate model. Therefore we choose it to pursue our analysis.
Table 7.2: AIC, BIC and McFadden Adjusted Pseudo-r2 - Models 1-3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AIC 3982.604 3978.797 3983.541
BIC 4653.036 4627.602 4632.346
McFadden Adjusted Pseudo-r2 0.075 0.076 0.075
Next section presents the estimates obtained for the whole model.
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7.6 Results
We present the multinomial logit estimates of Model 2 in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Vote Decision Multinomial Logit Estimates
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.141 (0.108) -0.105* (0.061) -0.061 (0.048) -0.064* (0.033)
Age2 -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001** (0.000)
Male -0.240 (0.269) 0.459 (0.295) 0.100 (0.246) 0.341** (0.170)
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ -0.707 (0.743) 1.510 (1.026) 2.043* (1.162) 0.036 (0.388)
751€-1500€ -1.101 (0.786) 1.493 (1.027) 2.237* (1.180) -0.113 (0.412)
1501€-2500€ -0.747 (0.859) 2.084** (1.034) 1.914 (1.219) -0.396 (0.454)
>2500€ -0.853 (0.895) 2.830*** (1.062) 2.246* (1.273) 0.235 (0.474)
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.934 (0.702) 0.113 (0.454) -0.278 (0.431) 0.354 (0.253)
Secondary 1.280** (0.650) 0.026 (0.406) -0.278 (0.434) 1.000*** (0.262)
High or postgraduate 1.646** (0.681) 0.348 (0.484) -0.658 (0.482) 1.029*** (0.311)
Married -0.135 (0.298) -0.253 (0.380) -0.391 (0.268) 0.215 (0.204)
Nº minors in the house 0.180 (0.205) 0.467** (0.184) -0.109 (0.180) 0.133 (0.103)
Catholic -1.548*** (0.345) -0.022 (0.535) -0.597 (0.397) 0.914** (0.430)
Unemployed -0.565 (0.479) -0.361 (0.673) -0.212 (0.437) -0.731** (0.355)
Public worker -0.124 (0.306) 0.004 (0.386) 0.058 (0.297) -0.439** (0.205)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.320 (0.374) -0.065 (0.498) -0.930** (0.396) -0.412 (0.324)
2-11x a year -0.234 (0.375) 0.121 (0.489) -1.380*** (0.398) -0.047 (0.290)
1x or more a month -1.519*** (0.487) -0.302 (0.491) -1.125*** (0.404) -0.355 (0.298)
Once a week or more -1.606*** (0.528) 0.982* (0.505) -1.190*** (0.458) 0.424 (0.290)
Trade union member -0.066 (0.331) -0.466 (0.421) 0.630** (0.312) -0.319 (0.228)
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM -4.297** (1.771) -1.267 (1.702) 0.503 (1.566) -0.623 (0.973)
2005 0.353** (0.148) 0.328** (0.144) -0.052 (0.111) -0.526*** (0.072)
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 0.617 (0.470) 0.060 (0.459) 0.952** (0.414) 0.370* (0.224)
Suburbs of large town or city 0.302 (0.490) 0.464 (0.511) 0.935* (0.484) -0.031 (0.279)
Large town or city 0.826* (0.453) 0.537 (0.460) 0.971** (0.462) 0.141 (0.255)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 0.675 (0.506) 0.248 (0.461) 0.222 (0.416) 0.190 (0.238)
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.015 (0.389) 0.190 (0.469) 0.169 (0.375) -0.461* (0.245)
Alentejo 0.191 (0.520) 0.659 (0.596) -0.010 (0.458) -0.236 (0.303)
Algarve 0.619 (0.817) 0.506 (1.123) 0.263 (0.800) 0.700 (0.448)
Intercept -1.624 (2.269) -2.227 (1.993) -1.451 (1.709) -0.441 (1.053)
N=1647 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Next section assesses the model fit and diagnoses potential problems.
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7.7 Model Diagnosis
Firstly, the log-likelihood chi-square test for global significance indicates that the model
as a whole is statistically significant with p < 0.001.
The percentage correctly classified, if the predicted choice corresponds to the maximum
predicted probability, is equal to 49.54%.
When we conduct the Stukel Lagrange multiplier test, the null hypothesis of correct model
specification is not rejected because the test of zero coefficient for the added regressor
yields a χ2(4) statistic of 3.49 with p = 0.4801. For the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-
of-fit test, using 10 groups, we obtain p = 0.180 and therefore we do not reject the null
of correct model specification.
Finally, we test for collinearity problems. The model takes six iterations to converge which
is a signal that there is not a high degree of multicollinearity. Coefficients for tolerance
and VIF are presented in the first two columns of Table A.11, in the appendix. Only for
age and its squared is the VIF larger than rule-of-thumb’s 10 value and is the tolerance
less than 0.1. With the appropriate centering, VIF and tolerance become lower than the
critical thresholds, as presented in the third and fourth columns of Table A.11, in the
appendix.
Overall, results validate the adequacy of our model. In the next section, we interpret the
results obtained.
7.8 Interpretation of Results
Results in Table 7.3 give us the impact of our regressors relative to the base category
(PS). To illustrate their impact more intuitively and taking into account that the sign of
the coefficients does not necessarily give the sign of the impact of these variables on that
party10, Table 7.4 presents the marginal effects at the mean. For the multinomial logit









pilβl is a probability weighted average of βl. For the dummy variables,
the marginal effect is the the discrete change in the predicted probability of voting for
that party as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. For each regressor there are five
10See Cameron and Trivedi (2009): page 502.
11See Cameron and Trivedi (2009): page 525.
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marginal effects corresponding to the five probabilities of voting for each party, and these
sum to zero because probabilities sum to one.
Table 7.4: Vote Decision Marginal Effects
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.005* -0.004 -0.003 -0.012* 0.013*
Age2 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000*
Male -0.012 0.018 -0.002 0.065** -0.068*
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ -0.043 0.033** 0.065*** -0.014 -0.042
751€-1500€ -0.054 0.034** 0.086*** -0.048 -0.019
1501€-2500€ -0.041 0.075*** 0.063*** -0.108 0.011
>2500€ -0.053 0.125*** 0.067** -0.010 -0.129
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.026 -0.000 -0.031 0.070 -0.066
Secondary 0.031 -0.016 -0.047 0.206*** -0.174***
High or postgraduate 0.043** 0.001 -0.076** 0.212*** -0.179***
Married -0.005 -0.015 -0.031* 0.060 -0.009
Nº minors in the house 0.004 0.022** -0.013 0.021 -0.034
Catholic -0.056*** -0.011 -0.060** 0.224*** -0.097
Unemployed -0.009 -0.004 0.005 -0.139** 0.148**
Public worker 0.000 0.007 0.015 -0.093** 0.071
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.005 0.008 -0.086* -0.042 0.125*
2-11x a year -0.004 0.013 -0.123*** 0.034 0.080
1x or more a month -0.045** -0.000 -0.098** -0.015 0.158***
Once a week or more -0.051*** 0.060** -0.123*** 0.130** -0.016
Trade union member 0.000 -0.021 0.054** -0.074 0.041
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM -0.128** -0.049 0.066 -0.080 0.191
2005 0.016** 0.025*** 0.007 -0.120*** 0.072***
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 0.012 -0.006 0.045** 0.056 -0.106**
Suburbs of large town or city 0.005 0.022 0.053* -0.032 -0.048
Large town or city 0.021 0.022 0.050** -0.005 -0.088
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 0.018 0.007 0.009 0.024 -0.059
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.004 0.017 0.022 -0.105** 0.062
Alentejo 0.007 0.037 0.002 -0.063 0.016
Algarve 0.011 0.012 -0.001 0.128 -0.150
N=1647 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are used.
7.8.1 Controls
For BE, PPD-PSD and PS, there is a curvilinear relationship between age and the prob-
ability of voting for these parties (Figure 7.5 shows the mean predicted probabilities as
age varies).
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Male individuals are more likely to vote for PPD-PSD (0.065 points) and less likely to
vote for PS (0.068 points).
Regarding income, we estimate that it has a statistically significant impact on the prob-
ability of voting for CDS-PP and CDU (see predictive margins in Figure 7.6).
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Education has a statistically significant impact on the probability of voting for BE, CDU,
PPD-PSD and PS, even though the difference for the base category (none or primary
education) is not significant for all the categories of this variable. Predictive margins are
presented in Figure 7.7.
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Married individuals are less likely to vote for CDU (0.031 points). The higher the number
of minors living in the house, the higher the probability of voting for CDS-PP (0.022
points for each additional minor).
Being catholic increases the probability of voting for PPD-PSD (0.224 points) and de-
creases the probability of voting for BE (0.056 points) and CDU (0.060 points). Unem-
ployed individuals are less likely to vote for PPD-PSD (0.139 points) and more likely to
vote for PS (0.148 points). Public workers are less likely to vote for PPD-PSD (0.093
points).
Church attendance has an impact on the probability of voting for all the parties, even
though the difference for the base category (never attends church) is not statistically
significant for all the categories of this variable, except for CDU. Figure 7.8 presents the
predictive margins for each party.
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Trade union membership increases the probability of voting for CDU (0.054 points).
For 2005, the probability of voting for BE, CDS-PP and PS is higher (0.016, 0.025 and
0.072 points, respectively) and the probability of voting for PPD-PSD is lower (0.120
points).
The degree of urbanization has an impact on the probability of voting for CDU (see Figure
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7.9) and for PS (the probability is lower in small or middle-size towns than in rural areas
or villages in 0.106 points).
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In terms of regional effects, individuals that live in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region
are less likely to vote for PPD-PSD (0.105 points) than those that live in the North.
Given the vast methodological differences that we have introduced, our results for the
control variables are not comparable with previous studies for Portugal.
7.8.2 District Magnitude
District magnitude only has a statistically significant impact on the probability of voting
for BE. Figure 7.10 illustrates the effect of district magnitude on the probability of voting
for this party, with predicted values derived from the estimation of Model 2 with all the
regressors except the inverse of district magnitude at the mean. The probability of voting
for BE increases as district magnitude increases, with diminishing returns.
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District magnitude is not statistically significant for the other parties, which is surprising.
We were expecting the marginal effect of district magnitude on large parties to be positive,
indicating that the probability of voting for them is larger in smaller districts, and negative
for small parties, indicating that the probability of voting for them is larger in larger
districts. Even though the marginal effects for CDS-PP and PS are signed according
to our expectations, they are not statistically significant; the direction for the marginal
effects of CDU and PPD-PSD is not the one we would expect and they are not statistically
significant.
7.9 Predictions
In order to estimate the effects of a potential reform to the electoral system on parties
votes, we compare the mean predicted probability of voting for each party under the same
alternative scenarios as in the previous sections of this study (Table 7.5). The results for
the national and single-member circles should be interpreted with caution since we are
dealing with out-of-sample predictions.
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Table 7.5: Mean Predicted Probability of Voting for Each Party Under the Alternative
Scenarios
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS
Current System 8.2% 6.1% 8.9% 30.5% 46.3%
Uniform Circles System 7.3% 6.0% 9.2% 30.6% 46.8%
180 MPs 7.5% 6.0% 9.2% 30.4% 47.0%
National Circle 13.6% 6.7% 7.2% 30.8% 41.6%
Single-Member Circles 0.1% 2.2% 18.6% 21.0% 58.0%
To illustrate the effects more intuitively, Table 7.6 presents the mean predicted probability
of voting for each party in 2005, with results weighted to replicate national level results
in the mainland.
Table 7.6: Mean Predicted Probability of Voting for Each Party Under the Alternative
Scenarios - 2005 (Weighted)
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS
Current System 6.8% 7.7% 8.2% 29.7% 47.6%
Uniform Circles System 6.1% 7.6% 8.5% 29.7% 48.1%
180 MPs 6.3% 7.6% 8.4% 29.5% 48.2%
National Circle 11.4% 8.5% 6.7% 30.2% 43.2%
Single-Member Circles 0.1% 2.8% 17.3% 20.3% 59.5%
Firstly, under the uniform circles system, the mean predicted probability of voting for
CDU and PS increases, for BE and CDS-PP decreases and for PPD-PSD remains similar.
Secondly, under a system with 180 MPs, the mean predicted probability of voting for BE,
CDS-PP and PPD-PSD decreases and for CDU and PS it increases. BE presents the
largest decrease in this probability (0.5 p.p.) and PS is the party with the largest increase
(0.6 p.p.).
Thirdly, under a national circle, the mean predicted probability of voting for BE, CDS-
PP and PPD-PSD increases, whereas for CDU and PS it decreases. The increase of this
probability for BE is substantial (4.6 p.p.) and is explained by the positive relationship
that we have found between the probability of voting for this party and district magnitude.
Finally, for single-member circles, we estimate a substantial decrease of the mean proba-
bility of voting for BE, CDS-PP and PPD-PSD (6.7 p.p., 4.9 p.p. and 9.4 p.p., respec-
tively) and a considerable increase for CDU and PS (9.1 p.p. and 11.9 p.p., respectively).
Contrarily to what was expected (for example by Teixeira (2009), VV.AA. (1998b) and
VV.AA. (1998c)), we estimate that this scenario would not “force” the electors to vote
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in one of the two major parties, which would reinforce the negative effects for the small
parties from a decrease in the proportionality of the system and lead to a bipolarization of
the system. Indeed, contrarily to this view, we estimate not only a substantial decrease of
the mean probability of voting for PPD-PSD but also a considerable increase of the mean
probability of voting for CDU. For BE, CDS-PP and PS the results are directionally in
line with these expectations.
Overall, whereas the results for BE, CDS-PP and PS, for the last three scenarios, are
directionally in line with our expectations, the same is not true for CDU and PPD-PSD.
The explanation lies in the fact that the sign of the marginal effects for these two parties
is not the one that we were expecting. This can be a consequence of the limitations of
our dataset (with a small number of observations for very small districts) and, therefore,
this is an important point for further studies to scrutinize (potentially using improved
datasets).
Within these limitations, these results shed light on a number of important points regard-
ing redistricting exercises. In particular, they suggest that reforms to the electoral system
would have consequences on the way individuals vote, adding to the consequences on the
conversion of votes into seats that have been simulated in previous research (Presidência
do Conselho de Ministros (1997) and Freire et al. (2008)). For example, these results
indicate that a reduction to 180 MPs would hurt BE and CDS-PP through a decrease of
the mean probability of voting for these parties, besides the so-discussed effect through
the decrease of the proportionality of the system (e.g. Antunes (2010)).
7.10 Sensitivity Analysis
We start by revisiting our model using the inverse of the logarithm of district magnitude
instead of the inverse of the logarithm of district magnitude plus one. The coefficients
of the control variables are similar (see Table A.12, in the appendix). Regarding district
magnitude, when we use our operationalization the mean predicted probability of voting
for BE is smaller in small districts and larger in large districts (see Figure 7.11).
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Then, we estimate the model assuming that εi1, ..., εi5 are independent, standard normal,
random variables (multinomial probit model12). To make the estimates comparable to
our previously estimated model, we compute the marginal effects at the mean. Results
are presented in Table A.13, in the appendix, and show little difference between the
models. For district magnitude, when the multinomial probit is used the mean predicted
probability of voting for BE in small districts is higher and in large districts is lower (see
Figure 7.12).
12Command mprobit using STATA 12.0
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Figure 7.12: Mean Predicted Pr(Vote BE) and District Magnitude: Using Multinomial
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We test whether the multinomial probit model is better than the multinomial logit. The
multinomial logit has a log likelihood of -1869.40 which is 2.59 higher than the -1871.99
for the multinomial probit, favoring the multinomial logit model.
Finally, a shortcoming of our analysis is that the multinomial logit imposes the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives property. In a party choice model, this property implies
that the ratio of the probability of choosing one party to the probability of choosing a
second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third party enters the race. A multino-
mial probit model that estimates the variance-covariance parameters of the latent variable
errors13 does not impose this property and therefore can clarify what might happen were
new parties to move in or current parties to drop out. However, when we use this estima-
tion method our model does not converge. This problem is in line with previous studies:
Lee and Kang (2009) state that “MNP hardly converges well” and that studies that use
it have “critical errors that non-identified parameters are estimated”. Moreover, Dow and
Endersby (2004) conclude that for most studies of vote choice “the IIA property is neither
relevant nor particularly restrictive” and Kropko (2007) adds that the multinomial logit
model “nearly always provides more accurate results (...) even when the IIA assumption
is severely violated”.
13Command asmprobit using STATA 12.0
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7.11 Conclusions
In this section we have presented a model of vote choice that outlines fundamental traits
about the way the Portuguese vote.
Regarding our controls, many variables are statistically significant and their analysis
uncovers factors that drive the decision of the Portuguese in choosing among the five
main parties.
Regarding district magnitude, our findings show that it has as a positive and significant
impact on the probability of voting for BE, with diminishing returns. Contrarily to our
expectations, for the other parties district magnitude is not statistically significant.
As for the other sections, we have made predictions for four alternative electoral scenarios.
For a scenario with uniform circles, results show that the mean predicted probability of
voting for CDU and PS increases, for BE and CDS-PP decreases and for PPD-PSD
it remains similar. For a reduction to 180 MPs, results show a decrease in the mean
probability of voting for BE, CDS-PP and PPD-PSD, and an increase for CDU and PS.
Our predictions for a national circle and single-member circles need to be interpreted with
caution given that they are out-of-sample predictions. They give us, however, a rough
idea of what would be the impact of these scenarios. For the national circle, the mean
predicted probability of voting for BE, CDS-PP and PPD-PSD increases, whereas for
CDU and PS it decreases. For single-member circles, we estimate a huge decrease of the
mean probability of voting for BE, CDS-PP and PPD-PSD and a substantial increase of
this probability for CDU and for PS.
For the last three scenarios, the results for BE, CDS-PP and PS are directionally in line
with our expectations, but the same is not true for CDU and PPD-PSD. The explanation
lies in the fact that the sign for the marginal effects for these two parties is not the one
that we were expecting.
Overall, we have shed additional light on the vote decision of the Portuguese and we
have shown the impact of district magnitude on this decision. Within the limitations
of our dataset, we demonstrate the importance of district magnitude on the way people
vote, reinforcing the importance of scrutinizing its impact and of giving it more attention
in further electoral reform debates. Also important is to study the impact of district
magnitude on the probability of voting for the Portuguese residual parties (which would
require a larger dataset and a disaggregation of this group into its several parties).
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8 Conclusions and Discussion
We have made five contributions in this study.
Firstly, the analysis of our control variables corroborates previous knowledge about the
electoral behavioral of the Portuguese but also contradicts other and sheds light on im-
portant new aspects. In particular, to our knowledge our study is the first contribution to
the understanding of the impact of individual-level determinants on the decision to vote
sincerely or strategically.
Secondly, we show that district magnitude has a statistically significant impact on the
probability of abstaining: we estimate that there is a steep decrease in this probability as
district magnitude increases followed by a flattening out of this relationship.
Thirdly, we show that district magnitude also has a negative impact on the probability of
voting strategically, with diminishing returns. Moreover, results indicate that the impact
of district magnitude on the probability of voting strategically is very similar to its impact
on the probability of abstention. Therefore, it is possible to have relatively low levels of
abstention and strategic voting while bearing relatively fewer of the costs associated to
very large districts, for example in terms of the so-discussed distance between the elected
and the electors.
Fourthly, we show that district magnitude plays an important role in shaping the choice of
party by individuals as it has a statistically significant positive impact on the probability
of voting for the “Left Block” party (BE).
Finally, the predictions for the uniform-size circles, reduction of Members of Parliament
to 180, national circle and single-member circles scenarios quantified the impact of these
redistricting exercises on the mean probability of abstaining, voting sincerely and voting
for each of the five main parties.
Notwithstanding, we identify five main limitations in our analysis.
Firstly, our dataset includes a small number of observations for very small districts and
we believe that this is influencing some points of our analysis as mentioned throughout
this study.
Secondly, ideally one would have a larger variation of district magnitude between 2002
and 2005, to have variation between years besides variation within districts. Indeed, even
though district magnitude changes in two districts between these years, these districts are
Portalegre, with a small number of observations, and Madeira, which is not included in
our dataset.
Thirdly, we use data for 2002 and 2005 and the behavior of individuals might have changed
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meanwhile, posing some limitations on the applicability of our results to a future electoral
reform.
Fourthly, our predictions for the national and single-member circles are out-of-sample
predictions, which requires caution in their interpretation, as mentioned throughout our
analysis.
Finally, as we are using survey data, besides the limitations associated to non-response,
the answers might be intentionally or accidentally false. Sigelman (1982) argues that “no
major differences emerge when identical discriminant models of voting are fitted using
respondent-reported and officially validated voting data” and Katosh and Traugott (1981)
refers that “there are no major changes in the fundamental nature of basic relationships”.
However, ideally one would have validated data.
Within these limitations, we believe that we have taken a big step by using individual-
level instead of aggregate data, by overcoming other shortcomings that we have identified
in previous research and by presenting an innovative approach that provides an idea of
the quantitative importance of non-mechanical effects that can result from redistricting
exercises. Therefore, this study should remind researchers and electoral system’s designers
that redistricting exercises imply more than changes in the conversion of votes into seats
and that these effects that result from the adjustment of electors’ strategies should be
given more attention in further electoral reform debates.
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Table A.1: Vote/Abstain Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Dependent Variable





Age Age of the respondent measured in
years.
min: 18 max: 89 mean: 45.08
Age2 Age squared. min: 324 max: 7921 mean: 2321.36
Male Gender of the respondent. (1) male: 49,29% (0) female: 50.71%
Income A set of dummies indicating the
income of the respondent.





Education A set of dummies indicating the
educational attainment of the
respondent.
Reference = No education or primary incomplete or
completed (0-4 years): 28.42%
(Basic) basic incomplete or completed (5-9 years):
20.53%
(Secondary) secondary incomplete or completed
(10-12 years): 28.82%
(High or postgraduate) higher incomplete or
completed or postgraduate incomplete or completed:
22.24%
Married Marital status of the respondent. (1) married or living together as married: 62.68%
(0) widowed, divorced or separated, married but
separated or single: 37.32%
Nº minors in the house Number of minors that live in the
house.
min: 0 max: 7 mean: 0.575
Catholic Religion of the respondent. (1) catholic: 88.38%
(0) other or none: 11.62%
Unemployed Whether the respondent is
unemployed or not.
(1) yes: 8.84% (0) no: 91.16%
Public worker Whether the respondent (or the main
contributor in the household if the
respondent is a student) works for the
public sector (central and local public
administration/autonomous public
entities/public enterprises).
(1) works for the public sector: 19.96%
(0) works for the private sector, on a mixed firm, for
a non-profit organization or is self-employed: 80.04%
INSTITUTIONAL
INVOLVEMENT
Church attendance How often the respondent goes to
church/attends religious services.
Reference = Never: 16.87%
(Once a year): 13.50%
(2-11x a year): 20.99%
(1x or more a month): 22.81%
(Once a week or more): 25.83%
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Table A.1: Vote/Abstain Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Trade union member Whether the respondent is a trade
union member or not.
(1) trade union member: 11.72%
(0) not a trade union member: 88.28%
POLITICAL VARIABLES
Close to a party Whether the respondent feels close to








Informed about politics Dummy variable indicating whether
the individual answered correctly to
the question: “Do you remember
which was the most voted party in
the last election?”
(1) yes: 92.61% (0) no: 7.39%
POSITION TOWARDS
ISSUES
Wealth inequality Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards wealth
inequality.
1- there should be a more equal distribution of wealth
10- there should be more incentives for individual
initiative
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 4.51
Taxes Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards taxes.
1- we should improve government services and social
assistance even if it means increasing taxes
10- we should reduce taxes, even if it means reducing
government services and social assistance
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 3.94
Government decision making Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards government
decision making.
1- increase citizen participation in government
decision making
10- government should make decisions quickly based
on the knowledge of experts
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 4.79
Context-level Variables
1/lnM Inverse of the logarithm of one plus
the number of seats in a district.
min: 0.26 max: 0.91 mean: 0.37
Rain Rainfall in the district capital (mm). min: 0 max: 24.67 mean: 3.95
2005 Dummy for the year 2005. (1) 2005: 50% (0) 2002: 50%
Urbanization A set of dummies indicating the level
of urbanization.
Reference=Rural area or village: 21.42%
(Small or middle-size town): 33.57%
(Suburbs of large town or city): 17.20%
(Large town or city): 27.81%
Regional Dummies A set of dummies indicating the
region where the respondent lives.
When districts belong to more than
one region, we include them in the
region of the district capital.
Reference=North: 35.67%
(Center): 20.91%
(Lisbon and Tagus Valley): 29.60%
(Alentejo): 10.21%
(Algarve): 3.61%
Correction Difference between aggregate turnout
figures and the reported turnout in
each district.
min: -0.32 max: 0.35 mean: 0.18
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Table A.2: Vote/Abstain Decision: Collinearity Diagnosis
Before age correction After age correction
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 41.26 0.02 1.90 0.53
Age2 40.44 0.02 1.30 0.77
Male 1.17 0.86 1.17 0.86
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ 6.90 0.15 6.90 0.15
751€-1500€ 8.84 0.11 8.84 0.11
1501€-2500€ 7.04 0.14 7.04 0.14
>2500€ 4.87 0.21 4.87 0.21
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 1.84 0.54 1.84 0.54
Secondary 2.81 0.36 2.81 0.36
High or postgraduate 3.44 0.29 3.44 0.29
Married 1.50 0.67 1.50 0.67
Nº minors in the house 1.41 0.71 1.41 0.71
Catholic 1.38 0.73 1.38 0.73
Unemployed 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90
Public worker 1.28 0.78 1.28 0.78
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year 1.80 0.56 1.80 0.56
2-11x a year 2.11 0.47 2.11 0.47
1x or more a month 2.20 0.45 2.20 0.45
Once a week or more 2.28 0.44 2.28 0.44
Trade union member 1.21 0.83 1.21 0.83
Political Variables
Close to a party (Ref=PS)
BE 1.36 0.73 1.36 0.73
CDS-PP 1.26 0.80 1.26 0.80
CDU 1.24 0.81 1.24 0.81
PPD-PSD 1.54 0.65 1.54 0.65
Other 1.15 0.87 1.15 0.87
None 1.83 0.55 1.83 0.55
Informed about politics 1.07 0.93 1.07 0.93
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 1.12 0.89 1.12 0.89
Taxes 1.10 0.91 1.10 0.91
Government decision making 1.11 0.90 1.11 0.90
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM 2.32 0.43 2.32 0.43
Rain 5.70 0.18 5.70 0.18
2005 5.05 0.20 5.05 0.20
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 2.12 0.47 2.12 0.47
Suburbs of large town or city 2.02 0.49 2.02 0.49
Large town or city 2.49 0.40 2.49 0.40
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 1.83 0.55 1.83 0.55
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Lisbon and Tagus Valley 2.53 0.40 2.53 0.40
Alentejo 2.18 0.46 2.18 0.46
Algarve 1.30 0.77 1.30 0.77
Correction 1.46 0.68 1.46 0.68
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.528* (0.301)
Secondary 0.479* (0.289)
High or postgraduate -0.050 (0.359)
Married 0.157 (0.236)
Nº minors in the house -0.101 (0.120)
Catholic -0.193 (0.312)
Unemployed -0.212 (0.334)
Public worker -0.598** (0.278)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.599* (0.313)
2-11x a year -0.251 (0.281)
1x or more a month -0.688** (0.314)
Once a week or more -0.798** (0.336)
Trade union member -0.518* (0.302)
Political Variables







Informed about politics -0.697** (0.318)
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 0.074*** (0.028)
Taxes 0.033 (0.035)





Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.191 (0.265)
Suburbs of large town or city 0.032 (0.313)
Large town or city 0.384 (0.298)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center -0.475 (0.307)






N=1728. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.528* (0.301)
Secondary 0.478* (0.289)
High or postgraduate -0.049 (0.360)
Married 0.155 (0.236)
Nº minors in the house -0.100 (0.120)
Catholic -0.195 (0.312)
Unemployed -0.201 (0.334)
Public worker -0.600** (0.279)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.601* (0.313)
2-11x a year -0.262 (0.282)
1x or more a month -0.686** (0.314)
Once a week or more -0.806** (0.336)
Trade union member -0.522* (0.302)
Political Variables







Informed about politics -0.694** (0.317)
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 0.073** (0.028)
Taxes 0.034 (0.035)





Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.192 (0.264)
Suburbs of large town or city 0.041 (0.314)
Large town or city 0.391 (0.299)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center -0.506 (0.313)






N=1728. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.052* 0.057*
Secondary 0.047* 0.048
High or postgraduate -0.005 -0.006
Married 0.015 0.012
Nº minors in the house -0.010 -0.009
Catholic -0.019 -0.027
Unemployed -0.020 -0.025
Public worker -0.059** -0.063**
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.068* -0.073*
2-11x a year -0.033 -0.034
1x or more a month -0.075** -0.079**
Once a week or more -0.085** -0.091**
Trade union member -0.052* -0.053*
Political Variables







Informed about politics -0.069** -0.076**
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 0.007** 0.008***
Taxes 0.003 0.003





Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.019 -0.021
Suburbs of large town or city 0.004 0.001
Large town or city 0.039 0.040
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center -0.050 -0.052





N=1728. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are used.
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Table A.6: Vote Sincerely/Strategically Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Dependent Variable
Sincere Whether the respondent voted
sincerely or not.




Age Age of the respondent measured in
years.
min: 18 max: 89 mean: 45.08
Age2 Age squared. min: 324 max: 7921 mean: 2321.36
Male Gender of the respondent. (1) male: 49,29% (0) female: 50.71%
Income A set of dummies indicating the
income of the respondent.





Education A set of dummies indicating the
educational attainment of the
respondent.
Reference = No education or primary incomplete or
completed (0-4 years): 28.42%
(Basic) basic incomplete or completed (5-9 years):
20.53%
(Secondary) secondary incomplete or completed
(10-12 years): 28.82%
(High or postgraduate) higher incomplete or
completed or postgraduate incomplete or completed:
22.24%
Married Marital status of the respondent. (1) married or living together as married: 62.68%
(0) widowed, divorced or separated, married but
separated or single: 37.32%
Nº minors in the house Number of minors that live in the
house.
min: 0 max: 7 mean: 0.575
Catholic Religion of the respondent. (1) catholic: 88.38%
(0) other or none: 11.62%
Unemployed Whether the respondent is
unemployed or not.
(1) yes: 8.84% (0) no: 91.16%
Public worker Whether the respondent (or the main
contributor in the household if the
respondent is a student) works for the
public sector (central and local public
administration/autonomous public
entities/public enterprises).
(1) works for the public sector: 19.96%
(0) works for the private sector, on a mixed firm, for
a non-profit organization or is self-employed: 80.04%
INSTITUTIONAL
INVOLVEMENT
Church attendance How often the respondent goes to
church/attends religious services.
Reference = Never: 16.87%
(Once a year): 13.50%
(2-11x a year): 20.99%
(1x or more a month): 22.81%
(Once a week or more): 25.83%
Trade union member Whether the respondent is a trade
union member or not.
(1) trade union member: 11.72%
(0) not a trade union member: 88.28%
POLITICAL VARIABLES
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Table A.6: Vote Sincerely/Strategically Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Close to a party Whether the respondent feels close to







Informed about politics Dummy variable indicating whether
the individual answered correctly to
the question: “Do you remember
which was the most voted party in
the last election?”
(1) yes: 92.61% (0) no: 7.39%
POSITION TOWARDS
ISSUES
Wealth inequality Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards wealth
inequality.
1- there should be a more equal distribution of wealth
10- there should be more incentives for individual
initiative
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 4.51
Taxes Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards taxes.
1- we should improve government services and social
assistance even if it means increasing taxes
10- we should reduce taxes, even if it means reducing
government services and social assistance
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 3.94
Government decision making Thermometer measure of the position
of the respondent towards government
decision making.
1- increase citizen participation in government
decision making
10- government should make decisions quickly based
on the knowledge of experts
min: 1 max: 10 mean: 4.79
Context-level variables
1/lnM Inverse of the logarithm of one plus
the number of seats in a district.
min: 0.26 max: 0.91 mean: 0.37
2005 Dummy for the year 2005. (1) 2005: 50% (0) 2002: 50%
Urbanization A set of dummies indicating the level
of urbanization.
Reference=Rural area or village: 21.42%
(Small or middle-size town): 33.57%
(Suburbs of large town or city): 17.20%
(Large town or city): 27.81%
Regional Dummies A set of dummies indicating the
region where the respondent lives.
When districts belong to more than
one region, we include them in the
region of the district capital.
Reference=North: 35.67%
(Center): 20.91%




Table A.7: Vote Sincerely/Strategically Decision: Collinearity Diagnosis
Before age correction After age correction
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 41.03 0.02 1.89 0.53
Age2 40.26 0.02 1.30 0.77
Male 1.17 0.86 1.17 0.86
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ 6.89 0.15 6.89 0.15
751€-1500€ 8.83 0.11 8.83 0.11
1501€-2500€ 7.03 0.14 7.03 0.14
>2500€ 4.87 0.21 4.87 0.21
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 1.83 0.55 1.83 0.55
Secondary 2.81 0.37 2.81 0.37
High or postgraduate 3.43 0.29 3.43 0.29
Married 1.49 0.67 1.49 0.67
Nº minors in the house 1.41 0.71 1.41 0.71
Catholic 1.38 0.73 1.38 0.73
Unemployed 1.10 0.91 1.10 0.91
Public worker 1.28 0.78 1.28 0.78
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year 1.79 0.56 1.79 0.56
2-11x a year 2.08 0.48 2.08 0.48
1x or more a month 2.17 0.46 2.17 0.46
Once a week or more 2.27 0.44 2.27 0.44
Trade union member 1.21 0.83 1.21 0.83
Political Variables
Close to a party (Ref=PS)
BE 1.15 0.87 1.15 0.87
CDS-PP 1.12 0.89 1.12 0.89
CDU 1.07 0.93 1.07 0.93
PPD-PSD 1.13 0.89 1.13 0.89
Other 1.07 0.93 1.07 0.93
Informed about politics 1.07 0.93 1.07 0.93
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality 1.12 0.90 1.12 0.90
Taxes 1.10 0.91 1.10 0.91
Government decision making 1.10 0.91 1.10 0.91
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM 2.07 0.48 2.07 0.48
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 2.12 0.47 2.12 0.47
Suburbs of large town or city 2.01 0.50 2.01 0.50
Large town or city 2.48 0.40 2.48 0.40
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 1.66 0.60 1.66 0.60
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 2.24 0.45 2.24 0.45
Alentejo 1.98 0.520 1.98 0.520
Algarve 1.19 0.84 1.19 0.84
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic -0.723 (0.546)
Secondary -1.032* (0.555)
High or postgraduate -1.149* (0.622)
Married 0.046 (0.459)
Nº minors in the house 0.126 (0.244)
Catholic -1.314* (0.753)
Unemployed 0.219 (0.622)
Public worker 0.815* (0.479)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -1.045* (0.620)
2-11x a year -0.306 (0.622)
1x or more a month -0.556 (0.640)
Once a week or more -0.560 (0.666)
Trade union member 0.536 (0.485)
Political Variables






Informed about politics 1.556*** (0.537)
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality -0.072 (0.054)
Taxes 0.065 (0.067)




Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.953** (0.484)
Suburbs of large town or city -2.141*** (0.589)
Large town or city -1.334*** (0.485)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 1.115** (0.510)




N=719. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic -0.043 -0.046
Secondary -0.060* -0.071*
High or postgraduate -0.068* -0.082*
Married 0.003 0.004
Nº minors in the house 0.007 0.011
Catholic -0.074* -0.074*
Unemployed 0.011 0.017
Public worker 0.048* 0.057*
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.064* -0.072*
2-11x a year -0.012 -0.006
1x or more a month -0.028 -0.027
Once a week or more -0.028 -0.027
Trade union member 0.032 0.035
Political Variables






Informed about politics 0.089*** 0.104**
Position towards issues
Wealth inequality -0.004 -0.005
Taxes 0.004 0.004




Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town -0.055* -0.070**
Suburbs of large town or city -0.125*** -0.152***
Large town or city -0.078*** -0.094***
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 0.068** 0.088**
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.058** 0.069**
Alentejo 0.079** 0.103***
Algarve -0.021 -0.020
N=719. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are used.
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Table A.10: Party Choice Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Dependent Variable








Age Age of the respondent measured in
years.
min:18 max: 89 mean: 45.08
Age2 Age squared. min: 324 max: 7921 mean: 2321.36
Male Gender of the respondent. (1) male: 49,29% (0) female: 50.71%
Income A set of dummies indicating the
income of the respondent.





Education A set of dummies indicating the
educational attainment of the
respondent.
Reference = No education or primary incomplete or
completed (0-4 years): 28.42%
(Basic) basic incomplete or completed (5-9 years):
20.53%
(Secondary) secondary incomplete or completed
(10-12 years): 28.82%
(High or postgraduate) higher incomplete or
completed or postgraduate incomplete or completed:
22.24%
Married Marital status of the respondent. (1) married or living together as married: 62.68%
(0) widowed, divorced or separated, married but
separated or single: 37.32%
Nº minors in the house Number of minors that live in the
house.
min: 0 max: 7 mean: 0.575
Catholic Religion of the respondent. (1) catholic: 88.38%
(0) other or none: 11.62%
Unemployed Whether the respondent is
unemployed or not.
(1) yes: 8.84% (0) no: 91.16%
Public worker Whether the respondent (or the main
contributor in the household if the
respondent is a student) works for the
public sector (central and local public
administration/autonomous public
entities/public enterprises).
(1) works for the public sector: 19.96%
(0) works for the private sector, on a mixed firm, for
a non-profit organization or is self-employed: 80.04%
INSTITUTIONAL
INVOLVEMENT
Church attendance How often the respondent goes to
church/attends religious services.
Reference = Never: 16.87%
(Once a year): 13.50%
(2-11x a year): 20.99%
(1x or more a month): 22.81%
(Once a week or more): 25.83%
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Table A.10: Party Choice Decision: Variables Used in the Models
Name Description Categories/Range
Trade union member Whether the respondent is a trade
union member or not.
(1) trade union member: 11.72%
(0) not a trade union member: 88.28%
Context-level variables
1/lnM Inverse of the logarithm of one plus
the number of seats in a district.
min: 0.26 max: 0.91 mean: 0.37
2005 Dummy for the year 2005. (1) 2005: 50% (0) 2002: 50%
Urbanization A set of dummies indicating the level
of urbanization.
Reference=Rural area or village: 21.42%
(Small or middle-size town): 33.57%
(Suburbs of large town or city): 17.20%
(Large town or city): 27.81%
Regional Dummies A set of dummies indicating the
region where the respondent lives.
When districts belong to more than
one region, we include them in the
region of the district capital.
Reference=North: 35.67%
(Center): 20.91%




Table A.11: Party Choice Decision: Collinearity Diagnosis
Before age correction After age correction
VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 39.55 0.03 1.96 0.51
Age2 39.13 0.03 1.34 0.75
Male 1.12 0.89 1.12 0.89
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ 5.28 0.19 5.28 0.19
751€-1500€ 6.11 0.16 6.11 0.16
1501€-2500€ 4.80 0.21 4.80 0.21
>2500€ 3.32 0.30 3.32 0.30
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 1.72 0.58 1.72 0.58
Secondary 2.46 0.41 2.46 0.41
High or postgraduate 2.94 0.34 2.94 0.34
Married 1.42 0.70 1.42 0.70
Nº minors in the house 1.34 0.75 1.34 0.75
Catholic 1.29 0.77 1.29 0.77
Unemployed 1.07 0.93 1.07 0.93
Public worker 1.23 0.81 1.23 0.81
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year 1.79 0.56 1.79 0.56
2-11x a year 2.16 0.46 2.16 0.46
1x or more a month 2.23 0.45 2.23 0.45
Once a week or more 2.34 0.43 2.34 0.43
Trade union member 1.14 0.88 1.14 0.88
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM 1.95 0.51 1.95 0.51
2005 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 1.92 0.52 1.92 0.52
Suburbs of large town or city 1.87 0.53 1.87 0.53
Large town or city 2.26 0.44 2.26 0.44
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 1.57 0.64 1.57 0.64
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 2.09 0.48 2.09 0.48
Alentejo 1.82 0.55 1.82 0.55
Algarve 1.15 0.87 1.15 0.87
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Table A.12: Party Choice Decision: Estimation of Model 2 Using ln(MPs)
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.141 (0.108) -0.105* (0.061) -0.062 (0.048) -0.064* (0.033)
Age2 -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001** (0.000)
Male -0.242 (0.269) 0.458 (0.295) 0.101 (0.247) 0.341** (0.170)
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ -0.708 (0.742) 1.490 (1.024) 2.044* (1.161) 0.031 (0.388)
751€-1500€ -1.107 (0.785) 1.472 (1.025) 2.240* (1.180) -0.119 (0.412)
1501€-2500€ -0.746 (0.858) 2.065** (1.032) 1.914 (1.219) -0.401 (0.454)
>2500€ -0.853 (0.894) 2.806*** (1.060) 2.247* (1.273) 0.229 (0.474)
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.927 (0.703) 0.110 (0.454) -0.279 (0.431) 0.353 (0.253)
Secondary 1.271* (0.651) 0.022 (0.405) -0.278 (0.434) 1.000*** (0.262)
High or postgraduate 1.642** (0.681) 0.346 (0.483) -0.657 (0.482) 1.029*** (0.311)
Married -0.136 (0.298) -0.250 (0.379) -0.392 (0.268) 0.214 (0.204)
Nº minors in the house 0.177 (0.205) 0.468** (0.184) -0.108 (0.179) 0.133 (0.103)
Catholic -1.550*** (0.345) -0.026 (0.536) -0.595 (0.397) 0.913** (0.430)
Unemployed -0.558 (0.481) -0.352 (0.674) -0.212 (0.437) -0.728** (0.355)
Public worker -0.132 (0.306) 0.007 (0.385) 0.062 (0.297) -0.439** (0.205)
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.327 (0.374) -0.066 (0.499) -0.930** (0.396) -0.414 (0.324)
2-11x a year -0.245 (0.376) 0.117 (0.491) -1.377*** (0.399) -0.050 (0.290)
1x or more a month -1.520*** (0.487) -0.304 (0.491) -1.125*** (0.404) -0.356 (0.298)
Once a week or more -1.612*** (0.527) 0.974* (0.507) -1.187*** (0.458) 0.422 (0.290)
Trade union member -0.072 (0.332) -0.470 (0.421) 0.631** (0.311) -0.319 (0.228)
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM -3.473** (1.385) -1.242 (1.222) 0.411 (1.133) -0.515 (0.720)
2005 0.352** (0.148) 0.327** (0.144) -0.051 (0.111) -0.527*** (0.072)
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 0.605 (0.468) 0.041 (0.460) 0.959** (0.416) 0.366 (0.225)
Suburbs of large town or city 0.306 (0.488) 0.444 (0.510) 0.942* (0.485) -0.033 (0.278)
Large town or city 0.830* (0.452) 0.526 (0.460) 0.974** (0.463) 0.141 (0.255)
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 0.640 (0.494) 0.258 (0.454) 0.222 (0.405) 0.186 (0.233)
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.019 (0.389) 0.178 (0.468) 0.222 (0.405) -0.461* (0.243)
Alentejo 0.177 (0.500) 0.697 (0.583) -0.021 (0.456) -0.229 (0.300)
Algarve 0.558 (0.804) 0.512 (1.119) 0.268 (0.796) 0.691 (0.444)
Intercept -1.830 (2.242) -2.159 (1.913) -1.440 (1.666) -0.456 (1.023)
N=1647 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.13: Party Choice Decision: Marginal Effects Using Multinomial Probit
BE CDS-PP CDU PPD-PSD PS
Individual -Level Variables
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.006** -0.005 -0.002 -0.121* 0.014*
Age2 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000*
Male -0.013 0.020 -0.004 0.062* -0.066*
Income (Ref=0€-300 €)
301€-750€ -0.065 0.042*** 0.069*** -0.008 -0.039
751€-1500€ -0.076 0.040*** 0.087*** -0.039 -0.012
1501€-2500€ -0.057 0.082*** 0.066** -0.111 0.019
>2500€ -0.079 0.130*** 0.070** -0.010 -0.111
Education (Ref=None or primary)
Basic 0.023 -0.007 -0.031 0.078 -0.063
Secondary 0.032 -0.023 -0.051 0.207*** -0.165***
High or postgraduate 0.048** -0.004 -0.085** 0.212*** -0.171***
Married -0.005 -0.012 -0.036* 0.058 -0.005
Nº minors in the house 0.006 0.024** -0.014 0.019 -0.035
Catholic -0.075*** -0.015 -0.069** 0.209*** -0.050
Unemployed -0.016 -0.004 0.001 -0.127* 0.147**
Public worker -0.002 0.013 0.019 -0.099** 0.069
Institutional Involvement
Church attendance (Ref=Never)
Once a year -0.002 0.011 -0.089** -0.037 0.118**
2-11x a year -0.008 0.014 -0.128*** 0.039 0.083
1x or more a month -0.054*** 0.001 -0.099** -0.005 0.157***
Once a week or more -0.060*** 0.059** -0.129*** 0.136** -0.006
Trade union member 0.002 -0.024 0.058** -0.066 0.031
Context-Level Variables
1/lnM -0.144** -0.057 0.068 -0.057 0.191
2005 0.023** 0.027*** 0.007 -0.124*** 0.067***
Urbanization (Ref=Rural area or village)
Small or middle-size town 0.016 -0.009 0.049** 0.056 -0.112**
Suburbs of large town or city 0.007 0.022 0.061** -0.030 -0.060
Large town or city 0.029* 0.021 0.054** -0.008 -0.095
Regional Dummies (Ref=North)
Center 0.014 0.010 0.008 0.024 -0.056
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.001 0.017 0.022 -0.010** 0.060
Alentejo -0.000 0.044 0.002 -0.059 0.013
Algarve 0.003 0.013 -0.006 0.130 -0.139
N=1647 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors are used.
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Note: We have used the number of electors published in STAPE (www.eleicoes.mj.pt) instead
of the number published in the Official Gazette because if we use the data from the Official
Gazette and apply the D’Hondt formula the distribution of district magnitude differs from the
one published in the Official Gazette. The difference between results from these two sources
has been acknowledged before by Freire et al. (2008).
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